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The "God Squad" Proves Mortal: Ex Parte
Contacts and the White House After
Portland Audubon Society

L Introduction
On February 10, 1993, the Umted States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit decided PortlandAudubon Society v EndangeredSpecies
Committee.1 The three member panel of the Ninth Circuit2 held that the
proceedings of the Endangered Species Committee (Committee), which
grants exemptions from the requirements of the Endangered Species Act
(ESA) 3 for proposed agency action, were subject to the Administrative
Procedure Act's4 (APA) ban on ex parte contacts. More importantly,

1. 984 F.2d 1534 (9th Cir. 1993).
2. Portland Audubon Soc'y v Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1534 (9th
Cir. 1993). Judge Reinhardt delivered the opinion of the court, in which Judge Nelson
joined. Id. Judge Goodwin filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 1551.
3. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).

See generally

BALANCING ON TnE BRINK OF ExBicICrON: THE ENDANGERED SPEcIEs Aar AND LESSONS

FOR THE FUTURE (Kathryn A. Kohm ed., 1991) (discussing ESA); ROCKY BARKER, SAVING
ALL THE PARTS: RECONCILING ECONOMICS AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (1993)
(same); Jared des Rosiers, Note, The Exemption ProcessUnderthe EndangeredSpeciesAct:
How the "God Squad" Works and Why, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV 825, 827-43 (1991)
(discussing history and policy behind ESA).
4. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified
at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5372, 7521 (1988)).
5. Portland, 984 F.2d at 1543. An ex parte communication is "an oral or written
communication not on the public record with respect to which reasonable prior notice to all
parties is not given, but it shall not include requests for status reports on any matter or
proceeding." 5 U.S.C. § 551(14) (1988). The original APA prohibited ex parte contacts in
any agency adjudication, but this provision did not apply to the agency or members of the
agency. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1970). Congress added the present provisions concerning ex
parte communications with the Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90
Stat. 1246 (1976) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (1988)).
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however, the court ruled that the APA's prohibition on ex parte commum6
cations also applied to the President and his White House staff.
Both courts and commentators have examined the scope of the
President's power to influence agency action in the rulemaking and
adjudicatory contexts. 7 These analyses often involve a convergence of the
APA and the doctrine of separation of powers and require a characterizaton of the relevant proceedings under the APA.8 The result is a wide
range of positions regarding when the President actually crosses the line
from supervising and guiding the executive branch to improperly influenc-

6. Portland,984 F.2d at 1548.
7 See generally Myers v United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926) (discussing
President's authority to supervise and guide executive branch officials); Sierra Club v
Costle, 657 P.2d 298, 404-08 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (discussing President's authority to interact
in agency proceedings); Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power and Admnistrative
Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451 (1979) (discussing President's role in regulatory process);
Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency
Rulemalang, 99 HARV L. REV 1075, 1080-88 (1986) (discussing benefits and answering
criticisms of White House review of agency rulemaking); Philip J. Harter, Executive
Oversight of Rulemaang: The President is No Stranger, 36 AM. U. L. REV 557 (1987)
(discussing presidential oversight of regulatory process); Oliver A. Houck, PresidentXand
the New (Approved)Decisionmalang,36 AM. U. L. REV 535 (1987) (same); Thomas 0.
McGarity, PresidentialControlofRegulatoryAgency Decisionmalang,36 AM. U. L. REV
443 (1987) (discussing President's role in regulatory process); Richard J.Pierce, Jr., The
Role of Constitutionaland PoliticalTheory in Adnmnstrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV 469,
520-24 (1985) (expressing desirability of presidential control over and judicial deference
to agency rulemaking); Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Administrative Processin Crisis-The
Example of PresidentialOversight of Agency Rulemaang, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 710
(1993) (discussing presidential oversight of regulatory process); Peter L. Strauss & Cass
R. Sunstem, The Role of the Presidentand OMB in Informal Rulemalang, 38 ADMIN. L.
REV 181 (1986) (same); Paul R. Verkuil, JawboningAdministrative Agencies: Ex Parte
Contactsby the White House, 80 CoLUM. L. REV 943 (1980) (discussing President's role
in regulatory process).
8. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988) (governing informal rulemaking); id. §§ 554,
556-557 (prescribing strict, trial-type procedures that agency mustuse in formal rulemaking
and formal adjudications). The APA does not provide explicit procedures for a fourth type
of agency action, informal adjudications, which are those agency adjudications that a statute
does not require the agency to make on the record. See Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee:
The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 SuP CT. REV 345, 384-86
(discussing informal adjudications under APA). This omission by the APA is strange,
considering that "informal adjudicationundoubtedly constitutes the vast majority of agency
actions." Id. at 385.
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Ing an agency action. 9 While there are relatively well-defined rules and
doctrines that courts can apply on either end of the APA spectrum,' 0 the
congressional creation of hybrid procedures," which the APA does not

9. Compare, e.g., DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 1075-80 (supporting
executive review of agency rulemaking) and Strauss & Sunstem, supra note 7, at 188-94
(arguing for more presidential control of regulatory process) and Verkuil, supra note 7, at
978-82 (arguing that courts should not extend restnctions on White House involvement in
agency proceedings to informal rulemaking context) with Bruff, supra note 7, at 500-06
(arguing presidential right to control regulatory process should be limited) and McGarity,
supra note 7, at 454-89 (arguing any presidential influence over agency proceedings must
be in open view).
10. See, e.g., Sierra Club v Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 401-02 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting
Congress did not intend APA prohibition on ex parte contacts to apply to informal
rulemaking proceedings); Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v United States, 269 F.2d
221, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (barring ex parte contacts when "conflicting private claims to
a valuable privilege" are involved). Therefore, the President has the authority to
commumcate the administration's policy goals during an informal rulemaking, while due
process prevents the President from attempting to influence an agency adjudication when
an individual is "exceptionally affected, in each case upon individual grounds," by the
agency proceeding. United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 245 (1973)
(quoting Bi-Metalli Inv Co. v State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 446 (1915)).
11. See Arthur E. Bonfield, The Questfor an Ideal State Administrative Rulemalang
Procedure, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REv 617, 657-58 (1991) (discussing advantages of hybrid
procedures that Congress has imposed on agencies); Harold H. Bruff, Presidential
Management ofAgency Rulemakzng, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV 533, 593 (1989) (noting that
Congress has created hybrid rulemaking programs that "employ some adjudicative
procedure"); Ronald A. Cass, Models ofAdnumstrative Action, 72 VA. L. REV 363, 383
(1986) (noting some statutes create process combining both adjudicatory and legislative
procedures); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifyng" the Rulemalang
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1399 (1992) (noting that Congress has imposed hybrid
procedures upon agencies "on a rather ad hoc basis"); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated
RulemakingBefore FederalAgencies:EvaluationofRecommendationsby theAdmnstrative
Conference of the United States, 74 GEO. L.J. 1625, 1696-97 (1986) (discussing hybrid
rulemaking). Hybrid rulemaking procedures also have been imposed by the judiciary,
especially during the 1970s, but the Supreme Court's decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 543-48 (1978),
halted this practice. See Scalia, supra note 8, at 348-52 (discussing judicially imposed
hybrid procedures); see also PETER L. STRAUSS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE
JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 174-75 (1989) (describing development of hybrid
rulemaking procedures); StephenF Williams, "HybndRulemalng"UndertheAdmnistrative ProcedureAct: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. REV 401 (1975)
(discussing hybrid rulemaking).
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address,' 12 forces courts into uncertain characterizations to justify uncertain results. The result in Portlandtypifies such a situation.
The controversy surrounding the ESA has lead to numerous proposals
calling for significant amendments to the ESA. 3 Indeed, the spotted owl
controversy, alone generating an immense number of cases, illustrates both
the importance of the ESA and the friction between environmental and
economic concerns.4 Given the uncertainty concerning the appropriate

12. See supra note 8 (noting that APA governs only three categories of agency
proceedings).
13. See S. 1521, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (proposing amendments to ESA); S.
1440, 103d Cong., lst Sess. (1993) (same); S. 921, 103d Cong., ist Sess. (1993) (same); S.
74, 103d Cong., lst Sess. (1993) (same); H.R. 2207, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (same);
H.R. 2043, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (same); H.R. 1490, 103d Cong., lst Sess. (1993)
(same); H.R. 888, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (same); see also 139 CONG. REC. S13,172,
S13,172-75 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1993) (statement of Senators Shelby, Gorton, and Packwood)
(introducing and discussing S. 1521); 139 CONG. REC. S10,841, S10,924-25 (daily ed. Aug.
6, 1993) (statement of Sen. Burns) (introducing and discussing S. 1440); 139 CONG. REc.
S5647, S5656-62 (daily ed. May 6, 1993) (statement of Sen. Baucus) (introducing and
discussing S. 921); 139 CONG. REc. S195, S491-92 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1993) (statement of
Sen. Metzenbaum) (introducing and discussing S. 74); 139 CONG. REc. E1476, E1476-77
(daily ed. June 10, 1993) (statement of Rep. Brewster) (discussing H.R. 2207); 139 CoNG.
Rnc. E807, E807-08 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1993) (statement of Rep. Tauzm) (discussing H.R.
1490).
14. See generally Portland Audubon Soc'y v Babbitt, 998 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1993)
(seeking injunction to protect habitat of Northern Spotted owl); Seattle Audubon Soc'y v
Espy, 998 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1993) (concerning environmental impact statement issued by
United States Forest Service for habitat of Northern Spotted owl); Portland Audubon Soc'y
v EndangeredSpecies Comm., 984F.2d 1534 (9th Cir. 1993) (dealing with alleged improper
ex parte contacts by President in Committee proceeding); Lane County Audubon Soc'y v
Jamison, 958 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1992) (addressing alleged failure by Bureau of Land
Management to consult with Fish and Wildlife Service); Portland Audubon Soc'y v Lujan,
884 F.2d 1233 (9th Cir. 1989) (seeking to enjoin sale of old-growth timber by Bureau of
Land Management), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1026 (1990); Douglas County v. Lujan, 810 F
Supp. 1470 (D. Or. 1992) (concerning designation of Northern Spotted owl's criticalhabitat);
Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Lujan, 806 F Supp. 279
(D.D.C. 1992) (examining regulations promulgated by Secretary of Interior), aff'd, 1 F.3d
1 (D.C. Cir. 1993), and rev'd inpart, No. 92-5255, 1994 WL 71984 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 11,
1994); Seattle Audubon Soc'y v Evans, 771 F Supp. 1081 (W.D. Wash.) (seeking
injunction to halt sale of logging rights in Northern Spotted owl habitat), aff'd, 952 F.2d 297
(9th Cir. 1991); Northern Spotted Owl v Lujan, 758 F Supp. 621 (W.D. Wash. 1991)
(addressing designation of Northern Spotted owl's critical habitat); Northern Spotted Owl v.
Hodel, 716 F Supp. 479 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (concerning listing of Northern Spotted owl
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level of presidential influence over hybrid agency proceedings, and the
potential for conflicts similar to those in Portland,15 the time is ripe for a
congressional clarification of the President's ability to referee exemption
disputes.
This Note, in the context of Portland, examines the scope of the
President's power to exert influence over an agency action with both
adjudicatory and rulemaking features. First, this Note examines the
background of Portland and sets out the Ninth Circuit's analysis that
supported the decision that the APA ban on ex parte communications
applies to both Committee proceedings and the President. 6 Second, this
Note takes a more detailed look at the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, specifically the validity of the characterization of Committee proceedings as
adjudicatory "1 Finally, this Note looks at the ramifications of the
under ESA); Alyson C. Flournoy, Beyond the "Spotted Owl Problem"-Learnng From the
Old-Growth Controversy, 17 HARv ENVTL. L. REv 261 (1993) (discussing Northern
Spotted owl controversy); Elizabeth A. Foley, The Tarnishing of an Environmental Jewel:
The EndangeredSpeciesAct and the NorthernSpotted Owl, 8 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 253
(1992) (same); Victor M. Sher, Travels With Stnx: The Spotted Owl's Journey Through the
Federal Courts, 14 PUB. LAND L. REv 41 (1993) (chromcling Northern Spotted owl
litigation).
15. See BARKER, supra note 3, at 6, 156-58 (discussmgeffect on agricultural irrigation
and hydroelectnedams due to protectionof several species of Snake River salmon on200,000
acre Columbia River watershed); 140 CONG. REc. S128-02 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1994)
(statement of Sen. Gorton) (describing how recovery of species of Columbia River salmon
caused $100 million increase in region's 1993 energy costs); see also J. Michael Kennedy,
U.S. Water Curb May Leave San Antonio High and Dry, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1993, at Al
(discussing federal judge's ruling that City of San Antomo must maintain flow to two springs
fed by Edward's Aquifer at all times to protect four endangeredspecies, thereby threatening
60 % of San Antomo's water supply in times of drought); Henry Schacht, EndangeredSpecies
Act DrawsFire in Californra, S.F CHRON., Jan. 23, 1993, at B2 (discussingproposedlisting
of giant garter snake as endangered species, which would require farmers to obtain permits
before they could plant or water crops). The ESA currently protects 277 domestic animals and
243 domestic plants as "endangered." BARKER, supra note 3, at 6. In addition, 97 animals
and 43 plants are "threatened." Id. Moreover, the ESA also protects 528 foreign species. Id.
These protected species, coupled with the 3,000 domestic species under consideration for
protection, show that the current conflicts betweenprotectingboth endangeredspecies and the
economy will only increase, not abate. Id. at 223.
16. See infra notes 18-60 and accompanying text (setting out background and Ninth
Circuit's analysis in Portland).
17

See infranotes 61-225 and accompanying text (analyzing Ninth Circuit's reasoning

in Portland).
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Portland decision in light of the doctrine of separation of powers and
concludes that although the policy behind the ESA and the APA may
prevent members of the general public from privately intervening in
Committee proceedings, the Ninth Circuit improperly applied the APA ban
on ex parte communications to the President.
I. Background of Portland Audubon Society v
Endangered Species Committee
On May 15, 1992, the Endangered Species Committee (Committee),
a cabinet-level body also known as the "God Squad,"'" comprised of six
high-rankig executive branch officials and a state representative, 19
granted an exemption from the requirements of the ESAI to the Bureau

18. See BARKER, supranote3, at 155 (explaining "God Squad" nickname). Commentators call the Committee the "God Squad" because the ESA gives the Committee the power
to allow a species to become extinct. Id.
19. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)(1) (1988) (establishing Committee). Congress created the
Committee and the exemption process m general by amending the Endangered Species Act
of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988). See Endangered Species Act Amendments of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 (creating Committee and exemption process). The
1978 Amendments created a seven member cabinet-level Committee comprised of the
Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of the Army, the Chairman of the Council of
Econonc Advisors, the Admimstrator ofthe Environmental ProtectionAgency, the Secretary
of the Interior, the Administrator of the National Oceamc and Atmospheric Administration,
and a presidential appointee from each affected state. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)(3) (1988). The
Secretary of the Interior serves as the chai-man of the Committee. Id. § 1536(e)(5)(B); see
infra note 20 (detailing exemption process).
20. The Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988). A key provision
of the ESA requires each federal agency to consult with the Secretary of the Interior (or the
Secretary of Commerce if the exemption process involves a mianne species) whenever the
agency "has reason to believe that an endangered species or a threatened species may be
present in the area affected by [an agency action] and that such implementation of such
action will likely affect such species." Id. § 1536(a)(3). The purpose of this consultation
is to ensure that the agency action is "not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any
unless such agency has been granted an
endangered
or threatened species
exemption" from the ESA. Id. § 1536(a)(2). If, after consultation with the agency under
§ 1536(a)(2), the Secretary determines that the proposed agency action would violate the
ESA, the agency may apply for an exemption. Id. § 1536(g)(1). If the Secretary
determines that the exemption application satisfies the threshold requirements of
§ 1536(g)(3)(A), the Secretary holds a hearing and submits a report to the Committee. Id.
§ 1536(g)(4). The Committee, based on the report, the record of the hearing, and any other
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of Land Management (BLM) for thirteen of forty-four proposed federal
timber sales in western Oregon. 2 ' On June 10, 1992, the Portland
Audubon Society (PAS) filed a petition for review with the Ninth Circuit.
PAS contended in the petition that flaws existed in both the exemption
application procedure and the ultimate Committee decision to grant the
exemption.22 Relying on published media reports by the Associated

testimony or evidence it receives, then has 30 days to grant or deny the exemption. Id.
§ 1536(h)(1). See des Rosiers, supra note 3, at 849-61 (discussing exemption process).
The 1978 amendments to the ESA created the original exemption process, winch
differed significantly from the present procedure. See generally Endangered Species Act
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 (detailing original exemption
process); des Rosiers, supra note 3, at 843-48 (discussing 1978 amendments). The primary
difference involved the use of a Review Board, which originally included "three members:
., and an admstrative
one appointed by the Secretary, one appointed by the President
law judge." H.R. CONF REP No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1979). The Review
Board would ensure that the application met the threshold requirements, conduct a formal
evidentiary hearing on the application, and submit a report to the Committee. Id. at 19-20.
In 1982, Congress amended the ESA, in part, to "streamline" the exemption process by
eliminating the Review Board, allocating the Review Board's duties to the Secretary, and
reducing the time periods allowed to complete each stage of the procedure. See S. REP
No. 418, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-19 (1982) (discussing changes to exemption process).
The Committee has granted only one exemption since Congress amended the ESA to
include the exemption process. The Committee granted an exemption to the Missouri Basin
Power Project on February 7, 1979. Portland Audubon Soc'y v Endangered Species
Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1537 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993). Another application, concermng Tellico
Dam and the famous snail darter, reached the Committee, but the Committee demed the
exemption. See infra note 98 (describing Tellico Dam exemption case). The Consolidated
Gram and Barge Company of St. Louis, Missouri, submitted an application in 1986, but
withdrew the application before the Committee took any action. See 51 Fed. Reg. 2750-01
(1986) (announcing withdrawal of application).
21. See 57 Fed. Reg. 23,405-02 (1992) (setting out decision of Committee).
22. Petitioners' Motion For Appointment of Special Master To Govern Discovery, and
For Leave to Conduct Discovery at 4, Portland Audubon Soc'y v Endangered Species
Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1536 (9th Cir. 1993) (No. 92-70436). In addition to the allegation
that improper ex parte contacts took place, PAS alleged that (1) BLM failed to consult with
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to ensure that the proposed timber sales would not
"jeopardize the continued existence of the northern spotted owl" before BLM applied to the
Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) for the exemption; (2) BLM violated the National
Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321, and § 7(k) of the ESA, (3) the Secretary
improperly convened the Committee to consider this matter; and (4) the Committee failed
to satisfy the statutory requirements set forth in § 7(h) of the ESA before the Committee
granted the exemption. Id. at 4-6.
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Press' and Reuters' alleging that the White House pressured Committee

23. See Scott Former, Bush Prods 'God Squad' to OK Timber Sales, Sources Say, THE
OREGoNiAN, May 6, 1992, at D09. The Associated Press (AP) report, in part, read as
follows:
The Bush administration is pressuring "God Squad" members to exempt 44
Northwest timber sales from the Endangered Species Act's protection of the
northern spotted owl, sources said Tuesday.
Two administration sources, speaking on conditions of anonymity, said that
at least three members of the panel have been summoned to White House
meetings to discuss coming decisions on the owl.
But a spokesman for Interior Secretary Manuel Lujan Jr. said the conversations pertain to general environmental policy and that no political pressure is
being placed on the Endangered Species Committee.
According to the sources, each of the meetings was attended by Lujan, the
chairman of the committee, and Clayton Yeutter, President Bush's domestic
policy advisor.
William K. Reilly, head of the Environmental Protection Agency and a
committee member, joined Lujan and Yeutter m meeting Tuesday, one source
said.
John Knauss, head of the National Oceamr. and Atmospheric Administration
and a committee member, attended a similar meeting within the last two weeks,
the source said.
Frances Hunt, a forestry specialist for the National Wildlife Federation, said
other administration sources had toldher that Knauss was pressured at the meeting
to vote for the exemption to the Endangered Species Act.
"My understanding is that it was all-out arm-twisting," she said Tuesday.
"Lujan is portraying this as something the administration needs."
Steve Goldstein, Lujan's chief spokesman, confirmed that Lujan and Reilly
met Tuesday with Yeutter.
"Clayton Yeutter is the environmental policy coordinator for the admimstration. We are part of the administration. But no one from the administration will
dictate to any committee member how they should vote," Goldstein said.
Id.
24. See Sue Kirchhoff, Debate Over Owl Protection Comes to a Head on the Hill,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 6, 1992, at A3 (publishing Reuters story). The Reuters
report was very similar in substance to the report of the AP"
Two administration sources told the Associated Press yesterday that the Bush
administration is pressuring members of the Cabinet-level panel to grant the
exemption.
The sources, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that at least three
members of the Endangered Species Committee, as it is formally known, have
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members to grant the exemption, PAS filed a motion seeking authority
from the Ninth Circuit to conduct discovery into the alleged contacts. PAS
asserted that the contacts would constitute improper ex parte commumcations under the APA.25 PAS noted that § 557 of the APA, when applicable, prohibits ex parte communications between agency decisionmakers and
interested parties outside the agency 26 Because § 557 applies to both
rulemaking and adjudicatory decisions that the enacting legislation requires
the agency to make "on the record after opportunity for agency hearing"'
and because the ESA requires both a hearing28 and a decision to be made
been called to White House meetings to discuss upcoming decisions on the owl.
But a spokesman for Lujan said the conversations pertain to general
environmental policy and that no political pressure is being placed on the panel.
Id.
25. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1538-39
(9th Cir. 1993). PAS sought: (1) interrogatories and documents identifying staff of
Committee and any relevant exchanges between the Committee staff and the White House;
(2) subpoenas for documents from the White House on the same subject; and (3) depositions
of persons identified m the first two sets of discovery requests. Id.
26. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1) (1988) (containing prohibition on improper ex parte
commumcations). Section 557(d)(1) states:
(A) no interested person outside the agency shall make or knowingly cause
to be made to any member of the body comprising the agency, administrative law
judge, or other employee who is or may reasonably be expected to be involved
in the decisional process of the proceeding, an ex parte commumcation relevant
to the merits of the proceeding;
(B) no member of the body comprising the agency, administrative law judge,
or other employee who is or may reasonably be expected to be involved in the
decisional process of the proceeding, shall make or knowingly cause to be made
to any interested person outside the agency an ex parte commumcation relevant
to the merits of the proceeding;
Id. § 557(d)(1)(A)-(B).
27 See id. § 553(c) (pertaining to rulemaking proceedings); rd. § 554(a) (pertaing to
adjudicatory proceedings). Section 553(c) states that "[w]hen rules are required by statute
to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this
title apply instead of this subsection." Id. § 553(c). Section 554(a) states that "[tlhis section
applies, according to the provisions thereof, in every case of adjudication required by statute
to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.
" Id. § 554(a).
28. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(4) (1988) (requiring Secretary of Interior to hold hearing
if exemption application meets threshold requirements of § 1536(g)(3)(A)(i)-(iii)). Section
1536(g)(4) states:
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"on the record," 29 PAS asserted that § 557's ban on ex parte communica-

tions applies to the Committee's exemption decisions. On this basis, PAS
sought to conduct discovery to determine if the alleged ex parte commumcations actually occurred."
II. Court's Analysis in Portland

In Portland,the Ninth Circuit addressed two key issues. First, the
court considered whether the § 557(d)(1) prohibition on exparte commumcations applies to Committee proceedings. 1 Second, the court considered
whether the ban on ex parte communications also applies to the President
and White House staff. 2
A. Application of the APA 's Ban on Ex Parte Communications
to Committee Proceedings
After noting that the ESA provisions dealing with the Committee do
not mention the APA, the Ninth Circuit found that the APA itself requires
that the APA apply to certain administrative proceedings. 33 Specifically,

If the Secretary determines that the Federal agency concerned and the
exemption applicant have met the requirements set forth in paragraph (3)(A)(i),
(ii), and (iii) he shall, in consultation with the Members of the Committee, hold
a hearing on the application for exemption in accordance with sections 554, 555,
and 556 (other than subsection (b)(1) and (2) thereof) of title 5 and prepare the
report to be submitted pursuant to paragraph (5).
Id.
29. See id. § 1536(h)(1)(A) (requiring Committee to make exemption decision "on the
record"). Section 1536(h)(1)(A) states that the Committee can grant an exemption if "it
determines on the record, based on the report of the Secretary, the record ofthe hearing held
under subsection (g)(4) of this section and on such other testimony or evidence as it may
receive
" Id.
30. Portland AudubonSoc'y v Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1536 (9th
Cir. 1993).
31. Id. at 1539-43.
32. Id. at 1543-48.
33. Id. at 1540. See Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 875-80
(1st Cir.) (discussing applicability of APA § 554 to certain administrative procedures and
ultimately determining that phrase "opportunity for public hearing" m § 402 of Clean Water
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988), without express statement that hearing must be "on the
record," requires formal adjudicatory hearing), cert. denied,439 U.S. 824 (1978); Marathon
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the court found that the statutory language of § 554 of the APA, which
deals with formal adjudication, triggers § 557, which contains the ban on
ex parte contacts whenever the provisions of § 554 govern an agency
proceeding. Therefore, the court found that the APA's ban on ex parte
contacts applies whenever the proceeding in question meets the three
requirements found in § 554(a).35 Section 554(a) of the APA applies if
the agency proceeding is (1) an adjudication; (2) on the record; and
(3) after an opportunity for an agency hearing.36
Applying these factors to Committee proceedings, the Ninth Circuit
first found that Committee proceedings are quasi-judicial insofar as the
Committee uses specific factual showings to determine whether it will grant
a particular exemption . 3 7 The court then examined the legislative history
of the ESA to support the view that Committee proceedings are "adjudications" under APA § 554(a). Specifically, the court found determinative a
Senate report describing the Committee as an "administrative court. "38
The Ninth Circuit also found that Committee proceedings satisfy the
second requirement of § 554(a) because the ESA compels the Committee
to decide "on the record" whether to grant an exemption.39 Finally, the
court determined that Committee proceedings satisfy the final requirement
of APA § 554(a) because the ESA requires the Committee to base its
decision, at least in part, upon the hearing that the Secretary of the Interior
holds pursuant to § 1536(g)(4) of the ESA.° Therefore, the court found
Oil Co. v EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1261-64 (9th Cir. 1977) (same); United States Steel Corp.
v. Tram, 556 F.2d 822, 833-34 (7th Cir. 1977) (same).
34. Portland,984 F.2d at 1540.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37 Id.

38. Id. at 1541 (quoting S. REP. No. 418, supranote 20, at 17); see infranotes 61-108
and accompanying text (analyzing court's determination that Committee proceedings are
adjudicatory).
39. Portland Audubon Soc'y v Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1541 (9th
Cir. 1993); see 16 U.S.C. §1536(h)(1)(A) (requiring Committee decision to be "on the
record"); infra notes 109-23 and accompanying text (analyzing court's determination that
Committee decision is "on the record").
40. Portland,984 F.2d at 1541, see 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A) (requiring Committee
to base final determination, m part, upon record of Secretary's hearing); infra notes 109-38
and accompanying text (analyzing court's determination that Committee proceedings satisfy
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that Committee proceedings satisfy the three requirements of § 554(a) of
the APA, thereby subjecting the exemption process to the APA ban on ex
parte communications found in § 557 41
B. Application of the APA 's Ban on Ex Parte Communications
to the Presidentand White House Staff
In analyzing whether the APA ban on ex parte contacts should apply
to the President in the context of exemption proceedings, the Ninth Circuit
first addressed the Government's three arguments as to why APA
42
§557(d)(1) should not apply to the President or White House staff.
First, the Government argued that neither the President nor a member of
the White House staff could be an "interested person" under the APA
because the President, due to his position as the core of the executive
branch, neither represents a particular agency nor has an interest in agency
proceedings that is greater than that of the public as a whole.43 After
noting that public policy 4 and the APA's legislative history45 support
broadly interpreting the phrase "interested person" to include public
officials, the Ninth Circuit relied on ProfessionalAir Traffic Controllers
Organization (PATCO) v FederalLaborRelationsAuthorty 46 to conclude
that the President and White House staff are "interested persons" under the
APA. 4 7

§ 554(a)).
41. Portland,984 F.2d at 1543.
42. Id. at 1543-44.
43. Id. at 1544.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 685 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see infra notes 146-50 and accompanying text
(discussing Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org. (PATCO) v. Federal Labor Relations
Auth., 685 F.2d 547, 562 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
47 Portland Audubon Soc'y v Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1545 (9th
Cir. 1993). The PATCO court found that Congress intended the phrase "interested person"
to be a "wide, inclusive term covering any individual or other person with an interest m the
agency proceeding that is greater than the general interest the public as a whole may have."
Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org. (PATCO) v Federal Labor Relations Auth., 685
F.2d 547, 562 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text (discussing
Ninth Circuit's analysis of PATCO).
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Second, the Government asserted that the President is not "outside the
agency" for purposes of APA § 557(d)(1),4"

Because all Committee

members are executive branch officials, the Government argued that
Congress explicitly recognized the role of the President in the Committee's
decisionmaking process and accordingly could not limit the President's
power to speak confidentially with any of his appointees on the Committee.49

The Ninth Circuit, however, determined that the President and

White House staff are not part of the Committee's decisionmakmg process
and are therefore "outside the agency" for purposes of the APA prohibition
on ex parte communications. 50
Finally, the Government argued that application of the APA's
prohibition on ex parte contacts would violate the separation of powers
doctrine.5 ' Relying on Myers v United States,52 the Government asserted that subjecting the President to the ban on ex parte commumcations
would impermissibly infringe on the President's constitutional duty to

48. Portland,984 F.2d at 1545.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1545-46. The court also rejected the Government's contention that Sierra Club
v Costle, 657 F.2d298 (D.C. Cir. 1981), asserts that contacts with the White House are not
ex parte contacts which taint the decisionmaking process. Portland,984 F.2d at 1545-46; see
infra notes 178-87 and accompanying text (discussing Sierra Club).
51. Portland,984 F.2d at 1546.
52. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). In Myers v Umted States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), the Supreme
Court addressed whether the Constitution gives the President the authority to remove
executive officers whom he has appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate. Id. at
106. President Wilson had demanded the resignation of a postmaster, Myers, whom he had
personally appointed. After Myers refused to resign, Wilson removed him from office and
Myers brought suit seeking his salary to the end of his term. Id. Premised on the belief that
the three branches of government should be kept separate unless expressly blended by the
Constitution and emphasizing the President's duty under the Take Care Clause, the Court
determined that Congress had no authority to limit the President's removal power of executive
officials. Id. at 134. The Court concluded that the President "may properly supervise and
guide their construction of the statutes under which they act in order to secure the unitary and
uniform execution of the laws which Article II of the Constitution evidently contemplated m
vesting general executive power in the President alone." Id. at 135. While recognizing m
dicta that "duties of a quasi-judicial character [could be] mposed on executive officers and
members of executive tribunals whose decisions after hearing affect interests of individuals,
the discharge of which the President can not m a particular case properly influence or
control," the Court found that this restriction would not limit the President's power to remove
such an executive officer. Id.
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"supervise and guide" his executive branch subordinates.53 Rejecting this
argument "out of hand," the Ninth Circuit used the Supreme Court's
analysis in Nixon v Administrator of General Services 4 to evaluate

whether Congress improperly interfered with a presidential power by
establishing Committeeprocedures that may forbidpresidential contact with
key cabinet officials during Committee proceedings. 5 After characterizing the impact on presidential power as "de minimis," the court found that
the policy goals the ban on ex parte communications furthered more than
outweighed any such infringement. 6 Moreover, the court found that if
the Government's separation of powers argument prevailed, the result
would "destroy the integrity of all federal agency adjudications. "57
Ultimately, after determining that Congress had the power to shield the
Committee from presidential control, the Ninth Circuit held that the APA's
prohibition on ex parte contacts applies to any commumcations between the
White House and the Committee that are relevant to the merits of a pending
exemption decision.58 Although finding for PAS on the merits, the Ninth
Circuit denied PAS's motion for expedited discovery '9Instead, the court
granted a remand to the Committee for an evidentiary hearing to determine
53. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1546 (9th
Cir. 1993).
54. 433 U.S. 425 (1977); see infra notes 159-67 and accompanying text (discussing
Nixon 1).
55. Portland,984 F.2d at 1546.
56. Id., see infra notes 159-61 and accompanying text (discussing Ninth Circuit's
determination that applying APA's prohibition of ex parte contacts to President in context of
exemption proceedings will not violate separation of powers).
57 Portland,984 F.2d at 1546-47
58. Id. at 1547-48. Whereas the court included the President inits holding that the APA
prohibits these types of ex parte communications, Judge Goodwm refused to extend the
APA's ban on ex parte contacts to communications from the President on the facts in
Portland. Id. at 1551 (Goodwin, J., concurring). While agreeing that executive and cabinet
level officials would be subject to the ban, Judge Goodwin would not have addressed the
"troubling separation of powers problems" when no evidence existed that President Bush
himself had any contact with members of the Committee. Id. (Goodwin, J., concurring).
59 Id. at 1549. The court determined that granting PAS's motion for discovery would
be improper because there was not a need for "extremely prompt action," wich such a
motion requires. Id. Instead, the Ninth Circuit concluded that allowing the agency to resolve
the factual issues that PAS's motion presented would protect the purposes behind the ESA.
Id.
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the nature and source of any improper contacts and their effect upon the
Committee's decisionmaking process. 6°
IV Analysis of the Court's Reasoning in Portland
The Ninth Circuit's initial characterization of Committee proceedings
as adjudicatory compelled the conclusion that both Committee proceedings
and the White House are subject to the APA ban on ex parte communications. This facially valid characterization, however, fails to portray
accurately the overall policy and procedure implicit in the ESA, both of
which support a characterization of Committee proceedings as something
other than either a pure adjudication or rulemaking under the APA. The
Ninth Circuit, faced with this dilemma of a hybrid procedure, chose to
characterize Committee proceedings as adjudicatory and ignored both the
internal and external inconsistencies that this determination creates.
A. Analysis of Court'sDecision that Committee

ProceedingsAre Adjudicatory
The Ninth Circuit's first characterization was that the proceedings of
the Committee are quasi-judicial, thereby satisfying the first prong of APA

60. Id. at 1549-50. Pursuant to the determination that any ex parte contacts would be
improper, the Ninth Circuit remanded the issue to the Committee to conduct an evidentiary
hearing into whether the alleged exparte communications actually took place. Id. However,
before the Committee held this hearing, the BLM withdrew the exemption application for the
proposed timber sales on April 19, 1993. Letter from Michael Penfold, Acting Director,
Bureau of Land Management, to Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior (Apr. 19, 1993).
Subsequently, on June 3, 1993, the Ninth Circuit granted the Committee's motion to dismiss,
having determined that the withdrawal mooted the need for a remand. See Portland Audubon
Soc'y v Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534 (9th Cir. 1993) (Order Granting Motion
to Dismiss as Moot, Denying Oregon Lands Coalition Request to Vacate Prior Opinion)
(dismissing case, thereby negating need for remand to Committee). This dismissal, however,
does not diminish the importance of this issue because the Ninth Circuit did not withdraw its
decision. For discussions of the current status of the Northern Spotted owl controversy, see
Eastside Ecosystem Management Strategy, Pacific Northwest Region, 59 Fed. Reg. 4680
(1994) (providing notice of intent to prepare environmental impact statement on Clinton
Administration's plan for managing forests in Pacific Northwest); Tom Kenworthy, Revised
Clinton Plan Saves More Forest, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 1994, at A4 (discussing Clinton
Administration's modified plan for managing forests in Pacific Northwest).
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§ 554(a).61 This characterization made inevitable the conclusion that APA
§ 557's ban on ex parte commumcations would apply to the exemption
process. 62 The court turned to both the legislative history of the ESA and
judicial precedent to support this characterization.63

To buttress the conclusion that Committee proceedings are quasi-adjudicatory, the court examined the legislative history of the ESA.' Specifically, the Ninth Circuit quoted a Senate Report that states that the "Endangered
Species Committee is designed to function as an administrative court of last
resort. "' The court, however, failed to put this statement in context.
61. See Portland Audubon Soe'y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1540 (9th
Cir. 1993) (finding Committee determinations to be "quasi-judicial"); id. at 1547 (noting that
President cannot interfere with "quasi-adjudicatory agency actions"). That the Ninth Circuit
labeled Committee proceedings "quasi-adjudicatory," as opposed to "adjudicatory," is also
important. See Edwin J. Madaj, Agency Investigations:Adjudication or Rulemaklng?-The
ITC's MaterialInjury DeterninationsUnder the Antidumping and CountervailingDuty Laws,
15 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 441,445 (1990) (noting problems with labels such as "quasiadjudication" and "quasiruleinaking"). Madaj says:
It is questionable whether tins "quasi" categorization means very much, particularly
since there appears to be no set definition of a quasi-adjudicative or quasi-legislative
proceeding
A quasiadjudication is not an adjudication, but rather some other
type of proceeding which the categonzer is unable to describe except by styling it
as something with similarities to an adjudicatory proceeding.
Id. Justice Jackson agreed, finding that the "mere retreat to the qualifying 'quasi' is implicit
with the confession that all recognized classifications have broken down and 'quasi' is a smooth
cover which we draw over our confusion as we might use a counterpane to conceal a disordered
bed." FTC v Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487-88 (1952) (ackson, J., dissenting).
62. See Portland,984 F.2d at 154041 (determining that Committee proceedings constitute
adjudications within meaning of APA § 554(a)).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1541.
65. S. REP. No. 418, supra note 20, at 17 In addition to the language characterizing the
Committee as an "administrative court of last resort," the Ninth Circuit found two more portions
of this Report relevant. First, the Report provides that the Committee is to base the final
decision, in part, upon a "formal adjudicatory hearing." Id. at 18. Second, the court states that
the Report "makes clear that the Committee's duty is to be an ultimate arbiter of conflicts that
the parties have been unable to resolve." Portland Audubon Soc'y v Endangered Species
Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1541 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing to pp. 16-17 of Report). The former
reference is of questionable value because there is no dispute that the Secretary holds a formal
adjudicatory hearing. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(4) (1988) (requiring Secretary, if threshold
requirements of exemption application satisfied, to hold hearing "in accordance with sections
554, 555, and 556 [of the APA]"). What is disputed, however, is whether the Committee
proceedings constitute an adjudication.
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First, the portion of the Report from winch the court extracted this
sentence deals with the requirement that an agency make a complete and

good faith effort to resolve a conflict between the proposed agency action and
the ESA through consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service.'

The

Senate intended the quoted passage merely to clarify that both the agency and
the Fish and Wildlife Service must make every conceivable attempt to

reconcile the agency action with the ESA, not necessarily to characterize the
Committee proceedings as adjudicatory I Second, the Senate prepared the
quoted Report nearly four years after Congress passed the legislation creating

the exemption process. This fact raises doubts about the Report's reliability
for conveying congressional intent pertaining to characterizations of
Committee proceedings.'
Finally, while additional portions of the
legislative history tend to support the Ninth Circuit's characterization,6 9

66. See S. REP. No. 418, supranote 20, at 17-18 (noting that Secretary should reject
any application "until all other administrative remedies have been pursued in good faith");
see also 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)-(c) (1988) (discussing consultation process).
67 See S. REP. No. 418, 97th Cong., 2d Sess 17 (1982) (discussing that under ESA,
"an action cannot be considered for an exemption unless every effort has been made to
resolve the conflict"). The original legislation required a determination that an "irresolvable
conflict" existed before the Review Board could prepare the report for the Committee. Id.
The 1982 Amendments to the ESA removed this requirement because Congress felt that "all
conflicts are 'resolvable' whether by accommodation, exemption, or otherwise, and that the
real purpose of this provision had been to ensure that every effort had been made by the
agency and the Fish and Wildlife Service to resolve the conflict before the Committee
examined the issue." Id. Congress, therefore, intended the key element of the phrase
"administrative court of last resort" to be "last resort," not "administrative court."
68. See S. RP. No. 418, supra note 20 (reporting Senate version of proposed
Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Stat. 1411). In
addition to Congress preparing the Report four years after the ESA created the Committee,
the House Conference Report for the 1982 Amendments does not contain language
characterinmg the Committee as an "administrative court of last resort." See H.R. CONF
REp. No. 835, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (failing to characterize Committee as
administrative court); supranote 20 (discussing how 1982 amendments changed exemption
process).
69. See H.R. CoNr RE. No. 835, supra note 68, at 28 (stating administrative law
judge will preside over formal hearing); S. Rap. No. 418, supranote 20, at 18-19 (requiring
Secretary to hold formal adjudicatory hearing to provide record of facts); H.R. CoNI REP.
No. 1804, supra note 20, at 19 (noting Secretary to hold formal adjudicatory hearing); H.
Rap. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1978) (same); S. RaP. No. 874, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 6 (1978) (providing that "final determination must be on the record and thus must be
accompamed by a formalhearing process"). The references to a formaladjudicatory hearing,
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other portions appear to refute the characterization by implying that the
evidence the Committee gathers after receiving the Secretary's report is not
subject to the strict guidelines of formal proceedings. 7" Indeed, a portion
of the legislative history goes so far as to compare the process to an
administrative hearing examiner making recommendations to an agency on
a "pending regulatory proposal." 7'
The court's determination that Committee proceedings are adjudicatory
is questionable for several other reasons. First, while the Committee grants
or denies exemptions on a case-by-case basis,72 the Committee bases
exemption decisions almost exclusively upon policy judgments.73 These

however, do not characterize Committee proceedings, but the hearing that § 1536(g)(4)
requires the Secretary to hold before preparing the report that § 1536(g)(5) requires. See
supranote 65 (noting that there is no dispute that Secretary's hearing is "formal").
70. See S. RP3p. No. 418, supra note 20, at 19 (noting that Committee is "not expected
to conduct additional formal adjudicatory hearings"); H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1804, supranote
20, at 20 (same); H.R. REP. No. 1625, supranote 69, at 24 (same). The Senate Report even
implies that APA protections are not strictly required for the Secretary's hearing: "[lit will
be practicable in most, if not all, cases to conduct the required hearing in accordance with
sections 554, 555, and 556 [of the APA]." S. REP. No. 418, supra note 20, at 18 (emphasis
added).
71. H.R. REP. No. 1625, supra note 69, at 14. The Report compares the exemption
process to an "administrative hearing examiner who makes recommendations to a Federal
agency on a pending regulatory proposal." Id.
72. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)-(p) (1988) (detailing exemption process).
73. See id. § 1536(g)(5) (detailing what Secretary's report to Committee must discuss).
Section 1536(g)(5) requires the Secretary's report to discuss:
(A) the availability of reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency
action, and the nature and extent of the benefits of the agency action and of
alternate courses of action consistent with conserving the species or the critical
habitat;
(B) a summary of the evidence concerning whether or not the agency action
is in the public interest and is of national or regional significance;
(C) appropriate reasonable mitigation and enhancement measures which
should be considered by the Committee; and
(D) whether the Federal agency concerned and the exemption applicant
refrained from making any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources
prohibited by subsection (d) of this section.
Id. § 1536(g)(5)(A)-(D). These factors mtrror the factors the Committee considers when
making the final exemption decision. Id. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(i)-(iv). The legislative history
makes clear, however, that these criteria are not the only factors the Committee can take into
consideration. See S. REP. No. 874, supra note 69, at 7 (stating that criteria found in
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policy considerations include balancing national goals and priorities against
the value of the endangered species that the proposed agency action will
harm.74 The ESA requires that the proposed agency action be both "in the
public interest" and "of regional or national significance" before the

Committee can grant an exemption.75 Taken together, therefore, the public
policy that the Committee considers and the legislative history of the ESA

indicate that Congress explicitly intended the Committee to examine only
agency action that concerns the public as a whole and that has far-reaching
environmental and economic implications.76 This intent runs counter to a

characterization of the Committee as a mere arbitrator of factual disputes
between an exemption applicant and a federal agency
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit's use of precedent in forming the key
characterization of Committee proceedings as adjudicatory is unpersuasive.
Relying on Marathon Oil Co. v Environmental ProtectionAgency,77 the
§ 1536(h)(1)(A) are not meant to limit Committee, but are only examples of factors
Committee should consider).
74. See H.R. CoNip REP. No. 1804, supra note 20, at 21 (providing factors for
Committee to consider when making exemption decision); H.R. REP. No. 1625, supranote
69, at 22 (same); S. REP. No. 874, supranote 69, at 7 (same). House Report No. 1625, for
example, states that besides the criteria the ESA lists, the Committee should "also consider
., the aesthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational and
the national interest
scientific value of any endangered or threatened species; and any other factors deemed
relevant." H.R. REP. No. 1625, supra note 69, at 22. On the floor of the Senate, during
consideration of the passage of the legislation creating the Committee, Senator Wallop stated
that the amendments provided a process by which the Committee could "balance the need to
protect andmanage endangered species while considering otherlegitimate nationalpriorities."
124 CONo. REc. 21,137 (1978).
75. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii) (1988).
76. See, e.g., Richard Siegal, Will the Winner be Owls or Jobs?, WASH. T]mES, Sept.
4, 1990, at C4 (discussing two studies concerning number ofjobs at stake m Northern Spotted
owl controversy). The Forest Service estimated that 28,000 jobs could be lost, while the
timber industry estimated that 44,500 people would lose theirjobs directly, and nearly 60,000
more indirectly. Id. The Fish and Wildlife Service estimated that the listing of the Northern
Spotted owl would result in 32,000 lostjobs, or one-third of the 110,000 timber-related jobs
mWashington and Oregon in 1989. BARKER, supranote 3, at 110, 120.
77 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977). In Marathon Oil Co. v EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 (9th
Cir. 1977), oil compames challenged the waste disposal levels of effluent limitations set
through permits by the EPA under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Act). Id. at
1256-57 The Act requires the EPA to provide an "opportunity for public hearing," and the
EPA interpreted this provision not to require a full adjudicatory hearing under the APA. Id.
at 1258. Petitioners brought suit, contending that the Act mandates a full adjudicatory
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court distinguished between quasi-judicial and rulemaking proceedings, 8
noting that the former involves adjudicating "disputed facts in particular
cases," whereas the latter requires the making of policy judgments that an
agency can apply to future cases. 79 Based upon this dichotomy, the Ninth
Circuit determined that Committee proceedings are quasi-judicial in that the
Committee considers specific exemptions and bases final decisions upon
"specific factual showings. "I
However, the court failed to note the key distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts."' Committee proceedings do not involve the

hearing in accord with §§ 554, 556, and 557 of the APA. Id. at 1260. The Ninth Circuit
agreed, finding that Congress, through the APA, recognized that when admimstration
proceedings resemble a judicial action, the APA requires procedural protections similar to
those in judicial proceedings. Id. at 1261. Based upon a dichotomy between "quasijudicial proceedings [that] determine the specific rights of particular individuals" and
"agency determinations that depend
more on the drawing of policy," the Ninth Circuit
determined that the Act's process for setting effluent limitations clearly were "adjudicatory"
in nature and that "[a]dversanal hearings [would] be helpful" to ensure reasoned
decisionmaking and effective judicial review. Id. at 1261-62. The Marathon Oil court also
addressed petitioner's contention that the APA's provisions for formal adjudications do not
apply to the permit hearing because the Act did not require the public hearing to be held
"on the record." Id. at 1262-63. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, asserting that
Congress did not intend the language of APA § 554(a) to be a "talisman." Id. at 1263-64.
Instead, the court found that Congress intended the substantive nature of the hearing under
the relevant statute to determine if the APA's formal adjudicatory provisions apply. Id. at
1263-64. Under this framework, the Marathon Oil court determined that the substantive
nature of the public hearing afforded permit applicants under the Act requires the formal
adjudicatory provisions of the APA to apply. Id. at 1264.
78. Portland Audubon Soc'yv Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1540 (9th
Cir. 1993).
79. Id. (quoting Marathon Oil Co. v EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1261 (9th Cir. 1977)).
80. Id.
81. See KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVELAW TREATISE
§§ 7.5, 10.5 (1994) (discussing widely accepted distinction between legislative and
adjudicative facts). Professors Davis and Pierce state:
Adjudicative facts are the kind of specific historic facts that are resolved
by a jury in a judicial trial-who, what, where, when, and why. Disputes
concerning the factual predicates of rules almost invariably concern legislative
facts. Legislative facts are the general facts on which all legal institutions-legislatures, courts, and agencies-predicate rules of law.
Id. § 7.5. The Second Circuit determined that in rulemakings:
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former because the Committee does not hear conflicting descriptions of the
situation. Rather, the Committee hears differing views of what is in the
public's best interest.' For example, in the case of the Northern Spotted
owl, the consultation process made clear that the proposed timber sales
would harm the Northern Spotted owl. In exempting the timber sales, the
Committee did not dispute that the proposed timber sales would be harmful
to the owl, but instead determined that the "social, cultural, economic and
other benefits" of the proposed timber sales outweighed the "ecological,
educational, scientific, and other benefits of alternatives which would
conserve the species." ' This is a policy decision involving legislative
facts to which the APA's prohibition should not apply I

[The key questions of fact [are] "legislative" rather than "adjudicatory"-that
is, they [are] matters of statistics, economics and expert interpretation, rather
than questions of whether
some norm [has been violated] and [someone]
would thus be subject to retrospective sanctions or other judicial questions of
who did what, when, and where.
Amencan Tel. & Tel. Co. v FCC, 449 F.2d 439, 454-55 (2d Cir. 1971). In addition, the
Justice Department, which helped draft the APA, stated that "[p]roceedings are classified
as rule makings under [the APA] not merely because, like the legislative process, they
result in regulations of general applicability, but also because they involve subject matter
demanding judgments based on technical knowledge and experience. " ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADmINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 126-27 (1947)
[hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL].
82. See H.R. REP No. 1625, supra note 69, at 23 (describing meaning of phrase
"public interest" in context of § 1536(h)(i)(A)(ii)); S. REP No. 874, supra note 69, at 7
(noting that Committee must determine which result is in public's best interest). House
Report No. 1625 provides that "[t]o be 'in the public interest,' an agency action must
affect some interest, right or duty of the community at large in a way which they would
perceive as positive. " H.R. REP No. 1625, supra note 69, at 23. Senate Report No. 874
states that "great care must be applied in trying to decide, finally, in cases of conflict,
what future course of action is in the public interest." S. REP. No. 874, supra note 69,
at 7 This belies an assertion that Committee proceedings are concerned with "individual
interests."
83. 125 CONG. REc. 14,571 (1979).
84. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 81, § 8.4 (arguing prohibition of ex parte
contacts should not apply to contested issues of legislative facts). Professors Davis and
Pierce state that the "statutory prohibition on ex parte communications should apply only
to communications with respect to contested, matenal adjudicatory facts. It should have
no application to issues of policy or legislative facts." Id.
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Third, the Ninth Circuit, while acknowledging that an impartial
decisionmaker is crucial to an adjudicatory decision," ignored the

inherent bias of the exemption process toward environmental concerns due
to the statutory makeup of the Committee.8 6 Although Congress attempt-

ed to create a balanced and expert Committee," the ESA's legislative
history indicates that the key congressional concern was to ensure an
informed, not an impartial, decision.88 The makeup of the Committee
85. Portland Audubon Soc'y v Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1543 (9th
Cir. 1993).
86. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)(3) (1988) (listing members of Committee).
87 See S. REP. No. 874, supranote 69, at 4 (discussing balance of Committee). The
Senate Report states that the Committee will "offer the involvement of the broadest array of
expertise and the greatest potential for a balancing of viewpoints concerning all the
alternatives to be considered." Id. The present makeup of the Committee represents a
comprormse over the proposals the House and Senate made. Senate Bill 2899 differed from
the enacted ESA in that the bill recommended that the Committee be comprised of the
Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of Agriculture, the
Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency, the Chairman of the Council onEnvironmental Quality, and the governor ofthe state
affected by the proposed agency action. See id. (listing proposed members of Committee).
House Resolution 14104, on the other hand, proposed a six member Committee comprised
of the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Interior, the
Administrator of the National Oceamc and Atmospheric Administration, the Chairman of the
Council on Environmental Quality, and the governor of the state affected by the proposed
agency action. See H.R. REP. No. 1625, supranote 69, at 14-15 (listing proposed members
of Committee). The enacted legislation adopted the Senate proposal for a seven member
Committee, but substituted the Char-man of the Council of Economic Advisors for the
Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality, the Administrator of the National
Oceamc and Atmospheric Administration for the Director of the Smithsonian, and made the
state representative a presidential appointee. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)(3) (1988) (listing
makeup of Committee).
88. See 124 CONG. REc. 21,288 (1978) (discussing Committee makeup and slant toward
environment); id. at 21,334 (same). Senator Culver of Iowa, co-sponsor of the amendments
creating the Committee, stated:
[W]e have I believe set up a system which will afford a very carefully considered
process whereby this Endangered Species Committee canweighthe evidence-we
have strengthened provisions for consultation-and can reach an informed
judgment. The Endangered Species Committee has been weighted in its voting
so that the presumption in favor of protection of the species is overwhelming.
Id. at 21,288. Similarly, Senator Stenis told the Senate not to "fool" themselves, as they
were "not setting up
an impartial commission that is going to make decisions by a
majority vote." Id. at 21,334.
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reflects a congressional attempt to balance environmental and developmental concerns."s Three Committee members appear inclined toward
environmental concerns and three lean towards development, leaving the
state representative to be a presidentially appointed wildcard. 9° The
requirement that five Committee members vote for an exemption before the
Committee grants an exemption, however, belies this "balance" because
only three votes are needed to defeat any exemption. 9 Thus, unless one
of the Committee's three environmentalists votes against an endangered
species, the Committee cannot grant an exemption. 92
Congress, through the ESA, has not created a panel of seven impartial
members who enter Committee proceedings with open minds as to the

89. See id. at 38,124 (noting Interior Department and National Oceame and Atmospheric
Administration represent environmental interests, while Departments of the Army and
Agriculture represent development concerns); id. at 21,146 (noting Secretary of Interior and
Administrator of Environmental Protection Agency are pro-environment). Based upon this
setup, the Secretary of the Interior, the Administrator of the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Admimstration, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
represent pro-environment concerns. The Secretary of the Army, Secretary of Agriculture,
and the Chairman ofthe Council of Economic Advisors represent pro-development interests.
Because the President appoints the seventh Committee member, the President will be able to
choose a state representative who shares the Admmistration's general views on the clash
between environment and economic concerns.
90. This "balance," of course, assumes Congress did not place the Chairman of the
Council of Economic Advisors on the Committee for his environmental views. See 125
CONG. Rc. 14,575 (1979) (noting that Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors is
not on Committee for environmental concerns).
91. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1) (1988) (requiring five affirmative votes before
exemption can be granted); 124 CoNG. REc. 21,146 (1978) (discussing burden on exemption
applicant that statutory makeup of Committee creates); supranote 88 (providing references
to floor debate discussing how Committee is deliberately weighted toward environment).
Senator Stennis, during debate on the amendments creating the Committee, stated that the
ESA creates "very heavy burdens of proof to be carried by a sponsoring agency. They are
particularly heavy when the requirement of five affirmative votes and the composition of the
committee is [sic] added.
The committee setup appears to me to be an institutional veto."
Id.

92. See Keith Schneider, White House on Conflicting PathsAs It Agrees to Protection
for Owl, N.Y TImEs, May 15, 1992, at Al (detailing voting results in Committee's final
decision in Portland). Both Manual Lujan, Jr., Secretary of the Interior, and John Knauss,
the Administrator of the National Oceame and Atmospheric Administration, voted to exempt
the 13 timber sales, meaning that two of the three "environmentalists" voted with the prodevelopment Committee members against the Northern Spotted owl. Id.
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exemption decision. Instead, Congress placed six high-ranking cabinet
officials and a presidential appointee on the CommitteeY. Congress

created the Committee with the knowledge that each Committee member
would be leaning toward a particular decision due to the policy views
implicit m that member's position in the executive branch.' Indeed, any

assertion that Congress chose these six cabinet officials solely because of
their expertise would be inaccurate. Congress easily could have enacted
legislation calling for the Committee to be comprised of experts with
superior qualifications and tailored to each particular exemption application.9' This structure would provide a more "informed" and politically
insulated Committee, and also would free six high-ranking cabinet officials
from weeks of hearings and deliberations and allow them to resume their
traditional executive branch duties.'
The enactment of the ESA as
written, therefore, indicates that Congress believed each Committee
member would need not only mere technical knowledge, but also a grasp
on the relevant policy considerations, which the Committee members would
hold by virtue of their positions m the executive branch.'
93. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)(3) (1988) (providing composition of Committee).
94. See supra notes 85-97 and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent to
weigh Committee toward environment).
95. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 4(a) (1988) (establishing Commodity Futures Trading
Commission and requiring President to nominate persons with "demonstrated knowledge" in
subject area); 15 U.S.C. §2053(a) (1988) (establishing Consumer Product Safety
Commissionand requirmgPresidentto appoint idividuals whose "backgroundand expertise"
qualify them for appointment); 19 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1988) (establishing United States
International Trade Commission and requiring President to appoint only those individuals
having "expert knowledge of international trade problems"); 42 U.S.C. § 907(a) (1988)
(establishing National Commission on Social Security and requiring members of "recognized
standing and distinction").
96. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1) (1988) (requiring Committee to gather any further
information and to make final determination within 30 days of receiving Secretary's report).
In addition to the 30 days the Committee will spend gathering information and deliberating,
the ESA also requires the Committee members to consult with the Secretary during the
hearing that § 1536(g)(4) requires, a process that can take up to 140 days. Id. § 1536(g)(5).
Indeed, Congress, recognizing theproblems that Committee members would face, said "[w]e
recognized that it will be exceedingly difficult to get the cabinet level committee members to
devote a substantial amount of personal time to the collection of evidence on the merits of any
exemption." 124 CoNG. REc. 38,133 (1978).
97 See Verkuil, supra note 7, at 964-65 (discussing how choice of procedure by
Congress can be relevant). Professor Verkuil states that "[b]y choosing to christen an
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Finally, the Ninth Circuit's characterization of Committee proceedings
as adjudicatory disregards other elements of the exemption process that are
inconsistent with regular notions of adjudicatory proceedings.
For
example, Congress has the power to circumvent individual Committee
decisions.9" Thus, although the legislative history shows a clear intent to

executive agency as the policymakmg vessel, Congress makes a considered judgment about
the need for stronger executive and political control." Id.
98. See generally StephenW Owens, CongressionalActionExempts Observatoryfrom
the Endangered Species Act, 13 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 314 (1993)
(discussing congressional exemptions for specific projects from environmental laws). The
best example of how Congress would be willing to void a Committee decision involves the
Tellico Dam in Tennessee, which helped bring about the creation of the Committee. Tellico
Dam was a project under the control of the Tennessee Valley Authority (IVA) and was 80 %
complete when Congress passed the ESA in 1973. When the dam was 90% complete, and
after the TVA had spent $100 million, a citizens group established that the proposed reservoir
would harm an endangered fish, the snail darter. See S. REP. No. 151, 96th Cong., lst Sess.
7-8 (1979) (discussing Tellico Dam case). A citizens group filed suit to enjoin construction
of the dam, but the district court refused to stop construction. Hill v. Tennessee Valley
Auth., 419 F Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), rev'd,549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 437
U.S. 153 (1978). On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed, determining that the TVA could not
complete the project until either Congress exempted the project or the Fish and Wildlife
Service delisted the snail darter. Hiliv Tennessee Valley Auth., 549 F.2d 1064, 1074 (6th
Cir. 1977), aff'd, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). The Supreme Court upheld this decision,
determining that the language of the ESA provided for no exceptions. Tennessee Valley
Auth. v Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978). The House subsequently passed an amendment
exempting the Tellico Dam project from the ESA, but then dropped this amendment in favor
of legislation creating the exemption process, including the Committee, to address and
balance the competing concerns. In addition, the amendments provided that the Committee
would conduct expedited review of the Tellico Dam project and a similar project on the
Missouri River, with the threshold requirements being waived. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No.
1804, supra note 20, at 25 (discussing provisions to provide for expedited review). The
Committee granted the exemption for the Missouri River project (the only exemption ever
granted until the Northern Spotted owl case), but voted unanimously to deny the Tellico Dam
exemption. Although Congress refused to grant a specific exemption for Tellico in the 1979
Amendments to the ESA, Tennessee congressmen were able to attach a rider to the Energy
and Water Development Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-367, 94 Stat. 1331. The bill passed
without the rest of Congress fully realizing that the rider would exempt Tellico Dam from all
environmental laws preventing its completion. See Cathryn Campbell, FederalProtection
of EndangeredSpecies: A Policy of Overkill?, 3 J.ENVTL. L. 219, 261 (1983) (discussing
how Congress passed this "midnight legislation"); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, In the Wake of the
SnailDarter:An EnvironmentalLawParadigmandits Consequences, 19 U. MiCH.J.L. REF.
805, 813 (1986) (same). See generallyTVA, F=rYYEARS OF GRASS-ROOTS BUREAUCRACY
(Erwin C. Hargrove & Paul K. Conkm eds., 1983) (discussing Tellico Dam case); WILUAM
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insulate Congress from most exemption decisions,' Congress likely
would not hesitate to overrule a Committee decision with which it
disagreed. 100

Committee proceedings are also inconsistent with normal concepts of
formal adjudication in that the ESA does not seem to contemplate
Committee proceedings involving a private claim to a valuable privilege.1" I Rather, Committee proceedings involve two entities, both
representing the public as a whole, differing as to what is m the public's
best interest.'
The ESA specifies who can apply for an exemption,
listing a federal agency, the governor of an affected state, and a permit or
license applicant.0 3 The initial parties to an exemption application,
therefore, will be a member of one of these three groups and the Secretary,

B. WHEELER & MICHAEL J. McDoNALD, TVA AND THE TELLICO DAM, 1936-1979: A
BUREAUCRATIC CRISIS IN POST-INDUSTRIAL AMERICA (1986) (same); Eric Erdheim, The
Wake of the SnailDarter Insunngthe Effectiveness of Section 7 of the EndangeredSpecies
Act, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 629 (1981) (same).
99 See 124 CONG. REc. 21,288 (1978) (noting congressional intent to insulate itself
from political pressure on exemption decisions); id. at 21,347 (noting Congress does not
want to sit as "judge and jury" on each individual exemption decision); S. REP No. 151,
96th Cong., 1st. Sess. 8 (1979) (noting Congress initiated exemption process in order to
avoid "ad hoc congressional review" of exemption decisions for which Congress has
"neither the time nor the expertise").
100. See STEvEN L. YAFFEE, PROHIBITiVE POLICY: IMPLEMENTING THiE FEDERAL
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 99 (1982) (noting Congress can exempt entire project from
ESA); supra note 98 (discussing Tellico Dam case).
101. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVELAW 103
(1993) (noting agency adjudications are normally between agency and individual or firm).
102. But cf. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(1) (1988) (allowing permit or license applicant to
apply for exemption). Although the availability of the exemption process to permit and
license applicants could conceivably involve a private individual or entity, this is not likely
considering the requirement that the proposed action be both "of regional or national
significance" and in the "public interest" before the Committee can grant an exemption.
Id. § 1536(h)(1)(A). If, however, such an action arose, due process concerns may require
the President to docket any relevant commumcations he has with Committee members that
relate to a pending exemption proceeding.
103. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(1) (1988) (listing potential applicants for exemptions
from ESA). Section 1536(g)(1) allows a "Federal agency, the Governor of the State in
which an agency action will occur, if any, or a permit or license applicant" to apply for an
exemption if the Secretary determines the proposed agency action will violate the ESA. Id.
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through the Fish and Wildlife Service." 4 In Portland, for example, the
imtial parties were the Fish and Wildlife Service, which determined that the
proposed federal timber sales would jeopardize the spotted owl, and the
Bureau of Land Management, which believed the economic benefits of the
timber sales outweighed the environmental consequences.105 Instead of
a conflict involving a private claim to a valuable privilege, the facts of
Portland represent the Committee making the final policy decision
regarding an issue on which two Executive agencies, both trying to carry
out a legislative mandate, could not reach a compromise.
In sum, the Ninth Circuit's portrayal of the exemption process as
adjudicatory is suspect because the procedures Congress designed constitute
a hybrid procedure under the APA, with both rulemaking and adjudicatory
features. Moreover, the very factors the court relies on to justify applying
the ban on ex parte communications to Committee proceedings, namely that
Committee hearings, meetings, and records are open to the public, 10 6 are
themselves more consistent with rulemaking proceedings than agency
adjudications. 0 7 Indeed, the nature and scope of the procedures the Com104. See 50 C.F.R. § 452.06 (1992) (identifying parties to exemption process). The
regulations provide:
(a) Parties. The parties shall consist of the exemption applicant, the Federal
agency responsible for the agency action m question, the [Fish and Wildlife
Service], and mtervenors whose motions have been granted.
Id.
105. See infra note 174 (discussing conflicting goals of Bureau of Land Management and
Fish and Wildlife Service).
106. Portland Audubon Soc'y v Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1542 (9th
Cir. 1993).
107 See 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(10) (1988) (allowing agency to close formal agency
adjudications and other agency proceedings "on the record after opportunity for a hearing");
Amrep Corp. v FTC, 768 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1985) (upholding invocation of § 552b(c)(10)
exemption by Federal Trade Commission), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1034 (1986); Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 727 F.2d 1195, 1199-1203 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (upholding invocation of exception by Nuclear Regulatory Commission to close
meeting concerning restart of nuclear power plant); Time, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv.,
667 F.2d 329, 334 (2d Cir. 1981) (discussing § 552b(c)(10) exemption); Shurberg
Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v FCC, 617 F Supp. 825, 829-30 (D.D.C. 1985) (upholding
invocation of § 552b(c)(10) exemptionby Federal Commumcations Commission even though
meeting was outside actual hearing process for renewal applications). Indeed, the Second
Circuit found that "[t]he evident sense of Congress [behind the exemption] was that when a
statute required an agency to act as would a court, its deliberations should be protected from
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mittee utilized in Portlandexhibit some of the rulemaking characteristics
that an exemption process can entail. 108
B. Analysis of Court's Decisionthat CongressIntended
APA §554 to Apply to Committee Proceedings
Even if the Ninth Circuit correctly characterized Committee proceedings as adjudicatory, APA § 554 applies only to those adjudications that
Congress intends to be "on the record after opportunity for agency
hearing."109

For the Ninth Circuit, having concluded that Committee

proceedings were adjudicatory, the determination that the exemption
decision was "on the record after opportunity for agency hearing" became
a mere formality 110 The determination that Congress specifically
intended APA § 554 to apply to the entire exemption process, however, is
not as rudimentary as the court indicated.
disclosure as a court's would be." Time, Inc., 667 F.2d at 334.
108. See SECRETARY

OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

TO THE ENDANGERED SPECIES COMMITTEE: RELATED TO THE APPLICATION BY THE
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT FOR EXEMPTION FROM THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION

7(A)(2) OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT Intro-3 to Intro-5 (Apr. 29, 1992) (discussing
evidentiary and public hearings held during Portland's exemption process) [hereinafter
SECRETARY'S REPORT]. Harvey C. Sweitzer, the administrative law judge designated by the
Secretary, conducted the hearing required by § 1536(g)(4) of the ESA on January 8-30,
1992, m Portland, Oregon. Id. at Intro-3. Pursuant to a notice m the Federal Register, the
Committee also held a public hearing on February 12-13, 1992, during which 97 witnesses
appeared and a further 1,800 submitted written documents. Id. at Intro-5. The parallels
between tls public hearing and the notice and comment mechamsms found m an informal
rulemaking are striking. Indeed, as lead counsel for PAS concedes, there is no doubt that
the Secretary, during the exemption process, considered the Committee to be engaged m a
rulemaking function. See Sher, supra note 14, at 53 (discussing Secretary's views of
exemption process). Sher quotes the Secretary as concluding "that the procedural
requirements for the exemption process 'are much less stringent than those required in an
adjudication."' Id. at 53 n.78 (citing Memorandum from Tom Sansonetti, Counsel,
Endangered Species Committee, to Harvey C. Sweitzer, Administrative Law Judge (Jan. 13,
1992) (copy on file with Sher)).
109. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988) (requiring that § 554 apply only when adjudication
is "required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency
hearing").
110. Portland Audubon Soc'y v Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1541 (9th
Cir. 1993).
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The ESA undoubtedly requires the Committee to place the final
exemption decision "on the record.""' Thus, the Ninth Circuit was
correct in noting that the ESA requires the Committee to base its decision,
at least in part, on a hearing.1 2 What is not clear, however, is whether
Congress intended the language of § 1536(h)(1)(A) of the ESA to subject
all Committee proceedings to the APA procedures governing formal
adjudications, as the Ninth Circuit held.
The ESA does not specifically use the key phrase "on the record after
opportunity for agency hearing. "13 Faced with this fact, the Ninth Circuit
made an unsupported determination that APA § 554 will apply whenever
an adjudication is "determined at least in part based on an agency
hearing. "114 Tlus determination is questionable because the Committee
does not have to base the final exemption decision solely upon the
evidence accumulated at the Secretary's hearing." 5 The ESA gives the
Committee wide latitude in making the final decision because the
Committee may also look to "such other testimony or evidence as it may

111. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A) (1988) (requiring Committee decisionto beplaced
on record).
112. See id. (requiring Committee to base final decision, in part, upon Secretary's
hearing held in accordance with § 1536(g)(4)).
113. See id. (detailing upon what Committee is to base final exemption decision). The
ESA requires the Committee to make the final determination "on the record, based on the
report of the Secretary, the record of the [Secretary's hearing] and on such other testimony
or evidence as it may receive." Id. But see Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v Costle, 572
F.2d 872, 876 (1st Cir.) (rejecting argument that exact words "on the record" are necessary
to trigger APA in adjudicatory context if statute provides for agency hearing), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 824 (1978). The Seacoastcourt also determined that the applicability of the APA
in the adjudicatory context must "turn on the substantive nature of the hearing Congress
intended to provide." Id. The Seacoast court presumed that unless the "statute otherwise
specifies, an adjudicatory hearing subject to judicial review must be on the record." Id. at
877 Therefore, if Congress provides for an agency hearing in an adjudicatory context, a
reviewing court can presume that APA § 554 applies, absent a discernible congressional
intent to the contrary. This is not determinative in Portland,however, because there is no
dispute that § 554 applies to the Secretary's hearing. Instead, the crucial issue is whether
application of § 554 to the Secretary's hearings requires the application of § 554 to
Committee information gathering and Committee deliberations.
114. Portland, 984F.2d at 1541.
115. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A) (1988) (detailing upon what Committee is to base
final exemption decision).
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receive."" 6 Congress may have meant § 554, however, to apply only
to adjudications that follow an agency hearing and that produce a final
decision based solely upon the record of that hearing." 7 When an
agency bases a final determination on any information not subject to the
guidelines of a formal hearing, as is the case with exemption decisions
under the ESA," 8 this reliance on nonrecord information greatly reduces
116. Id., see id. § 1536(e)(7)(A) (giving Committee discretion to take such evidence as
Committee "deems advisable").
117 See Seacoast, 572 F.2d at 877-78 (noting requirement for hearing ordinarily implies
requirement that decision will be made in accordance with evidence presented at hearing).
In Seacoast,the First Circuit quoted the Justice Department for the proposition that:
[W]ith respect to adjudication the specific statutory requirement of a hearing,
without anything more, carries with it the further requirement of decision on the
basis of evidence adduced at the hearing.
In fact, it is assumed that where
a statute specifically provides for administrative adjudication.
after opportunity for an agency hearing, such specific requirement for a hearing ordinarily
implies the further requirement of decision in accordance with evidence adduced
at the hearing.
Id. (quoting ATrORNEY GENBRAL'S MANUAL, supra note 81, at 42-43) (original emphasis
removed); seeVermontYankee Nuclear Power Corp. v NaturalResources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 546 (1978) (noting ATToRNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL is entitled to "some
deference" due to role of Department of Justice in drafting APA); see also Power Reactor
Dev Co. v International Union of Elec., Radio, & Mach. Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 408
(1961) (discussing deference given to "contemporaneous construction" of statute by enacting
body); United States v Zucca, 351 U.S. 91, 96 (1956) (providing deference to "contemporaneous construction" of statute by enforcing officer). More importantly, the legislative history
of the amendments adding the ban on ex parte communications to the APA supports the view
that § 554 only applies to adjudications in which the agency bases the final decision solely on
the record:
The bill also establishes for the first time a clear, statutory prohibition
against'pnvate ex parte commiumcations between agencies and outside parties on
matters being adjudicated by the agency. This provision assures that decisions
required by law to be made solely on the basis of a public record will not be
influenced by secret discussions that some of the parties to the proceeding, or the
public, do not know about.
S. REP. No. 354, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975).
118. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A) (1988) (allowing Committee to base final
determination, in part, upon evidence and testimony not presented at formal hearing). The
ESA and the regulations enacting the exemption process give the Committee wide latitude
in the taking of evidence and testimony. See id. § 1536(7)(A) (allowing Committee to hold
such hearings and take such evidence as Committee "deems advisable"); id. § 1536(8)(A)
(allowing Committee to promulgate and amend any rules, regulations, procedures, or orders
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the benefits of the ban on ex parte communications. 119 Following this
rationale, APA § 554 should not apply when the agency bases a final
decision, in part, on information not presented at the agency hearing.
Moreover, the court failed to address the fact that Congress amended
the crucial language of § 1536(h)(1)(A) four years after Congress enacted
the exemption procedure.12 The original provision allowed the Committee to base a final exemption decision on "the report of the review
board and on such other testimony or evidence as it may receive. "121
This language indicates that Congress did not originally intend to require
the Committee to base the final exemption decision, even m part, directly
on the evidence presented. at the hearing. Although the legislative history
of the amendments does not make clear why Congress changed the language," the legislative history of the 1982 amendments does indicate

that "it deems necessary"); H.R. CoNy REP. No. 1804, supra note 20, at 20 (noting
Committee is not to conduct second adjudicatory hearing); H.R. REP No. 1625, supranote
69, at 24 (same). Compare 50 C.F.R. § 452.05(a)-(e) (1992) (providing strict guidelines
and procedures for conduct of Secretary's hearings) wtth id. § 453.04 (allowing Committee
to conduct hearings in "informal manner," with time constraints limiting admissibility of
evidence).
119. See S. REP. No. 354, supra note 117, at 37 (noting that policy behind ban is to
ensure all interested persons have opportunity to reply to substance of illegal communications); id. at 1 (noting that ban applies only to determinations statute requires to be made
"solely on the basis of a public record").
120. See Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, § 4(a)(6),
96 Stat. 1411, 1420 (amending § 1536(h)(1)(A) of ESA).
121. H.R. CoNi REP. No. 1804, supranote 20, at 8.
122. See H.R. REP. No. 567, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 (1982) (failing to explain
change to language of § 1536(h)(1)(A)); S. REP. No. 418, supranote 20 (same); H.R. CoNF.
REP. No. 835, supranote 68 (same). Not only is the legislative history void of any rationale
for the change of language, but the authors of the amendments did not make the change until
the amendments reached conference. See H.R. CoN REP. No. 835, supranote 20, at 11
(noting change to § 1536(h)(1)(A)). Neither the House Report nor the Senate Report changed
the language of § 1536(h)(1)(A) to require the Committee to base the final decision, even in
part, upon the record of the Secretary's hearing. See S. REP. No. 418, supranote 20, at 17
(noting amendments will delete all references to Review Board and will substitute Secretary);
H.R. REP. No. 567, supra,at 5 (amending § 1536(h)(1)(A) only to substitute "Secretary" for
"Review Board"). This silence is crucial because Congress would not likely work such a
fundamental change, subjecting the entire exemption process to § 554, without debating or
explaining their rationale. Instead, Congress likely meant the change merely to ensure that
the Committee would not rely solely upon the Secretary's report to learn the facts and views
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that Congress intended the modifications only to "streamline the exemption
process," not to "alter the substantive requirements or standards that were
adopted in 1978. "1
Even if Congress did not intend the language of § 1536(h)(1)(A) to
subject the entire exemption process to the strict guidelines of APA § 554,
a reviewing court should examine the ESA as a whole to determine
whether other elements of the statute require the formal procedures of
§ 554 to guide Committee deliberations, thereby making the prohibition
on ex parte contacts applicable. Although § 1536 does make two explicit
references to the APA, 24 the language is ambiguous as to whether the
APA provisions identified in § 1536(g)(6) pertain solely to the hearings
the Secretary holds, or also to Committee deliberations." z Overall, the

adduced at the Secretary's hearing.
123. S.REP No. 418, supra note 20, at 16.
124. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(4), (6) (1988) (requiring hearings to be held in
accordance with APA §§ 554, 555, and portions of 556). Section 1536(g)(4) says:
If the Secretary determines that the Federal agency concerned and the
exemption applicant have met the [threshold requirements] he shall, in
consultation with the Members of the Committee, hold a hearing on the
application for exemption in accordance with sections 554, 555, and 556 (other
than subsection (b)(1) and (2) thereof) of title 5 and prepare a report to be
submitted pursuant to paragraph (5).
Id. § 1536(g)(4). Section 1536(g)(6) says:
To the extent practicable within the time required for action under
subsection (g) of this section, and except to the extent inconsistent with the
requirements of this section, the consideration of any application for an
exemption under this section and the conduct of any hearing under this
subsection shall be in accordance with sections 554, 555, and 556 (other than
subsection (b)(3) of section 556) of title 5.
Id. § 1536(g)(6).
125. See id. § 1536(g)(6) (setting out ambiguous language). There is no dispute that
the ESA limits the references to the APA in § 1536(g)(4) to the hearing discussed in
§ 1536(g)(4). While PAS argued that § 1536(g)(6) applies to the actions of both the
Committee and the Secretary, the Committee asserted that § 1536(g)(6) only refers to
actions of the Secretary Portland Audubon Soc'y v Endangered Species Comm., 984
F.2d 1534, 1543 n.22 (9th Cir. 1993). The noted APA provisions, however, could not
be referring to the Committee hearings because they are not held under subsection (g).
See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(6) (1988) (making noted APA provisions only applicable to
hearings held pursuant to subsection (g)). Therefore, to subject the Committee to the
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ESA grants the Commttee broad discretion in the content and manner of
amassing the relevant information on which the Committee will make a

listed APA provisions, a reviewing court would have to read § 1536(g)(6) to include
Committee deliberations as a "consideration of any application for an exemptionunder this
section." 1d. This requirement, however, would render the portions of § 1536 allowing
the Committee broad discretion in the taking of testimony and evidence almost
meaningless. See id. § 1536(e)(7)(A) (showing broad discretion given Committee); id.
§ 1536(B)(8) (same). Section 1536(e)(7)(A) states: "The Committee may for the purpose
of carrying out its duties under this section hold such hearings, sit and act at such times
and places, take such testimony, and receive such evidence as the Committee deems
advisable." Id. § 1536(e)(7)(A) (emphasis added). Section 1536(E)(8) states that "[i]n
carrying out its duties under [§ 1536], the Committee may promulgate and amend such
rules, regulations, and procedures, and issue and amend such orders as it deems
necessary." Id. § 1536(E)(8). A more logical reading, therefore, of the "consideration
of any application" language in § 1536(g)(6) would involve interpreting the phrase to
simply refer to the consideration of applications by the Secretary under § 1536(g)(l)-(3).
The Committee's argument is equally untenable, as the Committee's interpretation
would subject the § 1536(g)(4) hearing to a different portion of APA § 556 than
§ 1536(g)(4) lists. Compare 16 U.S.C. 1536(g)(4) (1988) (requiring § 1536(g)(4) hearing
to be in accordance with APA § 556 other than subsections (b)(1) and (2)) with id.
§ 1536(g)(6) (requiring hearings under subsection (g) to be in accordance with APA § 556
other than subsection (b)(3)) (emphasis added). Section 556(b) of the APA states: "There
shall preside at the taking of evidence: (1) the agency; (2) one or more members of the
"
body wlch comprises the agency; or (3) one or more administrative law judges.
5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (1988). Therefore, if APA § 556(b)(1) and (2) do not apply, an
adimustrative law judge, not the Secretary, would conduct the hearing held pursuant to
§ 1536(g)(4) of the ESA. If APA § 556(b)(3) does not apply, as in § 1536(g)(6), the
Secretary would preside over the hearing, although any other Committee member(s) or the
entire Committee could also do so.
Thus, because § 1536(g)(6) cannot refer to hearings held pursuant to § 1536(g)(4)
and because Committee hearings are not held under subsection (g), an ambiguity exists.
One possible interpretation would be to read § 1536(g)(6) as providing an alternative
process when the time constraints of the normal procedure do not allow the admimstrative
law judge to hold the § 1536(g)(4) hearing "in consultation with Members of the
Committee." 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(4) (1988). For example, the admimstrative law judge
cannot hold a hearing pursuant to § 1536(g)(4) until the President selects the state
representative to the Committee pursuant to § 1536(g)(2)(B) because § 1536(g)(4) requires
consultation with the Committee. If the President cannot quickly choose the state
representative, there may not be sufficient time to hold the necessary formal hearing and
prepare an adequate report. Therefore, when time does not allow a § 1536(g)(4) hearing,
one could read § 1536(g)(6) to allow the Secretary himself, as opposed to the admimstrative law judge, to preside personally over the formal hearing, negating the need for
consultation with the Committee.
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final determination. This broad discretion counters the assertion that
Congress meant to subject Committee deliberations to guidelines
customarily associated with formal adjudications.' 2 6
The legislative history of APA § 557(d)(1) shows that a key purpose
behind the ban on ex parte communications was to allow interested

persons the opportunity to reply to the contents of improper communications with decisionmakers. 127 The ESA, on the other hand, seems to
provide for this type of rebuttal evidence only at the Secretary's hearings,
not during Committee hearings or information gathering.12 That the
ESA requires all portions of the exemption process to be open to the

126. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)(7)(A) (1988) (granting Committee broad discretionary
powers in conducting heanngs and amassing evidence); id. § 1536(h)(1)(A) (allowing
Committee to base decision, in part, on "such other testimony or evidence as it may
receive"). Section 1536(e)(7)(A) states that the "Committee may for the purpose of
carrying out its duties under this section hold such hearings, sit and act at such times and
places, take such testimony, and receive such evidence as the Committee deems
advisable." Id. § 1536(e)(7)(A).
In addition, there are some indications that Congress did not even consider the
Committee to be an "agency" subject to the APA. See H.R. REP No. 1625, supra note
69, at 23 (stating Committee not agency); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1804, supra note 20, at
20 (same). House Report 95-1625 states that the "[House committee] does not intend that
either the review board or the Endangered Species Committee should be considered as
Federal agencies except as provided for m the bill. The Federal Advisory Committee Act
shall not be applicable to either the review boards or the Endangered Species Committee."
H.R. REP. No. 1625, supra note 69, at 23; see 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)(7)(D) (1988)
(implying Committee is not federal agency).
Section 1536(e)(7)(D) states: "The
Committee may use the United States mails in the same manner and upon the same
conditions as a Federal agency." Id. The Committee, however, did not argue in Portland
that the Committee was not an agency under the APA. Portland Audubon Soc'y v
Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1539 n.10 (9th Cir. 1993).
127 See S. REP No. 354, supra note 117, at 37 (stating that purpose of prohibition
of ex parte communications is to give interested persons chance to respond to improper
commumcations). The Report states:
The purpose of this provision is to notify the opposing party and the public,
as well as all decisiomnmakers, of the improper contact and give all interested
persons a chance to reply to anything contained in the illegal commumcation. In
this way the secret nature of the contact is effectively eliminated.
Id.
128. See supra note 118 (discussing how ESA, legislative history, and enacting
regulations show how much discretion Committee given m information gathering procedures).
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public'29 is not inconsistent with this conclusion because the legislative
history of the Government in the Sunshine Act indicates that public
attendance does not include the ability to participate. 3 ' Thus, because
Congress did not provide for cross-examination or rebuttal of evidence
collected after the Secretary's hearing, any contention that Congress
intended a different result for information that a Committee member
receives outside the exemption process is questionable.
The Department of the Interior, the Department of Commerce, and
the Committee promulgated the regulations that govern the ESA and thus
provided an agency interpretation of the procedures the legislation mandates.'31 While the regulations explicitly require any hearing held by the
Secretary to be in accord with APA §§ 554, 555, and 556,132 the regulations dealing with Committee deliberations and information gathering do
not mention the APA.'33 More importantly, the regulations explicitly
make APA § 557(d), banning ex parte contacts, applicable to the Secretary's hearing and report, while the regulations do not contain a similar
provision referring to Committee deliberations or information gathering. 3 The Ninth Circuit, however, discounted the relevance of this
regulation, contending that the regulation merely clarified an ambiguity in
the ESA. 13 '

129. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)(5)(D) (1988) (requnring all Committee meetings and
records to be open to public); id. § 1536(g)(8) (requiring all records and activities relating
to subsection (g) to be open to public).
130. See S. REP. No. 354, supranote 117, at 1-2 (noting amendments to APA do not
increase right of public to participate in agency process); 1d. at 5 (noting policy of reducing
public distrust in government operations is served by mere attendance at meetings).
131. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 450-453 (1992) (enacting procedures to carry out exemption
process).
132. See id. § 452.05(a) (requiring Secretary's hearing to be in accordance with APA
§§ 554, 555, and 556).
133. See id. §§ 453.03, 453.04 (failing to mention any APA provisions).
134. See id. § 452.07(b) (referring to APA § 557(d)). The regulation states: "The
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 557(d) apply to the hearing and the preparation of the report." Id.
135. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1542 (9th
Cir. 1993). The Ninth Circuit determined that because § 1536(g)(4) does not explicitly
could conceivably lead to considerable confusion."
mention APA § 557, the "omission
Id. Therefore, the court felt the reference to § 557(d) serves to "eliminate the confusion and
remove any doubt as to the applicability of the ex parte commumcations prohibition to the
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In sum, the ESA itself does not explicitly require the application of
§ 557's prohibition on ex parte contacts.136 Therefore, to find that
§ 557 applies to exemption proceedings, the Ninth Circuit determined that
Congress, through § 1536(h)(1)(A) of the ESA, implicitly called for APA
§ 557(d)(1) to apply "I While this is a plausible reading of the statute,
the Ninth Circuit's determination is debatable. 3
However, even if
Congress did intend § 557 of the APA to apply to exemption proceedings,
the Ninth Circuit's determination that Congress also meant to include the
President within this prohibition does not necessarily follow
C. Analysis of Court's Decision that PresidentIs Subject
to APA Ban on Ex Parte Communications
Having determined that the § 557(d)(1)" 9 prohibition on ex parte

contacts applies to Committee proceedings, the Ninth Circuit considered
whether the prohibition also applies to the President and White House
staff."4 The court's analysis involved determinations that the President

proceedings before the Secretary." Id. The court believed this clarification was
unnecessary as to Committee actions because § 1536(h)(1)(A) governs Committee actions
and does not mention some APA provisions while leaving out § 557 Id. The court's
argument is unpersuasive, particularly after the assertion that APA § 557 applies whenever
§ 554 does. See Portland,984 F.2d at 1540 (asserting §§ 556 and 557 apply whenever
§ 554 does). In addition, this determination is valid only as long as the court accepts the
Committee's argument that § 1536(g)(6) does not apply to Committee proceedings. See
supra note 125 and accompanying text (discussing ambiguity of § 1536(g)(6)). If
§ 1536(g)(6) applies to the Committee, then the same ambiguity results because
§ 1536(g)(6) mentions some APA provisions while leaving out APA § 557 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(g)(6) (1988). The court also justified the determination on the basis that a contrary
finding would violate the explicit policy of the ESA to ensure that all exemption
proceedings are open to the public. Portland,984 F.2d at 1542.
136. See supranote 33 and accompanying text (noting Ninth Circuit's determination
that ESA does not explicitly reqire APA § 557 to apply).
137 See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text (setting out Ninth Circuit's
rationale for determination that § 1536(h)(1)(A) implicitly calls for APA § 557(d)(1) to
apply).
138. See supranotes 61-135 and accompanying text (discussing problems with court's
determination that § 1536(h)(1)(A) implicitly calls for APA § 557(d)(1) to apply).
139. See supra note 26 (setting out text of APA § 557(d)(1)).
140. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1543-
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was both an "interested person" and "outside the agency" for the purposes
of § 557(d)(1).

41

These determinations, however, are questionable.

The legislative history of § 557(d)(1) of the APA indicates that courts
should give the phrase "interested person" a broad reading, and that the
phrase includes "public officials
with a special interest in the matter
regulated. "42 While the court correctly notes that the President is
interested in all agency proceedings, 43 this does not necessarily render
the interest either "special" or "greater than the general interest of the
public as a whole," as Congress required.' 4 Indeed, the President, by
virtue of his office, is elected to serve and represent the "general interest
of the public as a whole" and consequently could not have an interest

48 (9th Cir. 1993).
141. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1) (1988).
142. See S. REP No. 354, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1975) (implying courts should
interpret phrase "interested person" broadly). The Report says the term:
is intended to be a wide, inclusive term covering any individual or other person
with an interest in the agency proceeding that is greater than the general
interest the public as a whole may have. The interest need not be monetary,
nor need a person be a party to, or intervenor in, the agency proceeding to
come under tins section. The term includes, but is not limited to, parties,
competitors, public officials, and nonprofit or public interest organizations and
associations with a special interest in the matter regulated. The term does not
include a member of the public at large who makes a casual or general
expression of opimon about a pending proceeding.
Id.
143. See Portland, 984 F.2d at 1545 (noting President has "interest in every agency
proceeding") (emphasis in original). In addition, the Ninth Circuit's determination that
the President or a member of the White House staff could be an "interested person" in
every agency proceeding ignores the practical effect of such an edict. Id. at 1545. As
"interested persons," the President and White House staff should have the right to be
heard if they have relevant views to offer. The court's holding, however, would subject
the President to the inflexible schedules of each particular agency action. See Verkuil,
supra note 7, at 979 (discussing problems with subjecting President to agency schedule).
The holding also ignores the presumption of executive privilege. See infra notes 196-204
and accompanying text (discussing executive privilege in context of Portland). This
practicality problem is particularly troublesome when Congress mandates accelerated
action and hybrid procedures, such as in Portland.
144. See S. REP No. 354, supra note 117, at 36 (providing language interpreting
phrase "interested person").
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beyond that of the general public as a whole solely by reason of his position

in the executive branch.' 45
The Ninth Circuit, in determining that the President is an "interested

person," compared the executive branch's alleged involvement in Portland
to the Secretary of Transportation's involvement in ProfessionalAirTraffic
Controllers Organization (PATCO) v Federal Labor Relations Authority 1 In PATCO, a strike endorsed by PATCO seriously affected air
service throughout the United States and led to a charge of unfair labor
practices against PATCO. 147 Following an administrative hearing on the
issue, the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) revoked PATCO's
status as exclusive bargaining representative for the striking air traffic
controllers.' Following the adverse determination, PATCO alleged that
FLRA members had engaged in improper ex parte contacts during the case,
including a charge that the Secretary of Transportation telephoned a FLRA
member to discuss the pending strike negotiations. 49 The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, however, declined to
determine whether the phone call was improper, noting that the contact was
not prejudicial and that the FLRA representative acted in good faith."5
In Portland,the Ninth Circuit interpreted PATCO as a determination
by the D C. Circuit that the Secretary of Transportation could be an
"interested person" under the APA.' However, even if the D C. Circuit
had made such a determination, PATCO is distinguishable from Portland
because, unlike the Secretary of Transportation, the President occupies the

145. See Verkuil, supranote 7,at 978-79 (noting special status of President). Professor
Verkuil states that the "President is obviously not 'like everyone else'- he happens to have
been elected by 'everyone else' to run the executive branch and see that the laws are faithfully
executed." Id.
146. 685 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
147 Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org. v Federal Labor Relations Auth., 685
F.2d 547, 551-52 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
148. Id. at 554.

149. Id. at 558-59.
150. Id. at 568.
151. Portland AudubonSoc'y v Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1545 (9th
Cir. 1993). The Portlandcourt found it "evident" that the D.C. Circuit opinion determined
the Secretary of Transportation to have "a special interest in a major transportation dispute
which is beyond that of the general public and that [the Secretary of Transportation] is
therefore an interested person." Id.
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central seat m the executive branch and is responsible for the overall
direction of the executive branch, notjust one department. Thus, while the
Secretary of Transportation could conceivably have a "special interest" in
Therefore, the
a matter before that agency, the President could not.'
very nature of the President's position in the executive branch distinguishes
even the Ninth Circuit's attenuated reading of PATCO
Another questionable aspect of the Ninth Circuit's determination that
the APA's ban on ex parte communications is applicable to the President
is the court's reluctance to adhere to the Supreme Court's language in
Franklin v Massachusetts.53 The Franklin Court, in analyzing whether

the President was an "agency" for purposes of judicial review under the
APA, concluded that an "express statement by Congress" was necessary
before the Court would find the President's actions to be reviewable.M

152. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 750 (1982) (noting President's unique
status). The Court found that the "President's unique status under the Constitution
distinguishes hun from other executive officials." Id.
153. 112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992). In Franklinv Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992),
Massachusetts and two registeredvoters challenged the reapportionment of seats mthe United
States House of Representatives after the 1990 census, alleging that the Census Bureau's
allocation of overseas defense personnel to their "home of record" was arbitrary and
capricious under the APA. Id. at 2770-71. In the past, the Census Bureau normally excluded
overseas personnel from census figures, and the switch in allocation methods caused a
Representative to shift from Massachusetts to Washington. Id. at 2770. After each census,
the Census Bureau sends the census figures to the Secretary of Commerce, who then submits
the reapportionment data to the President. Id. at 2771. The President then makes a report
to Congress delineating the number of Representatives for each state. Id.
Under the APA, a court can only review "final agency action," 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988),
so the Franklin Court first addressed whether the transmittal of the census figures to the
President by the Secretary of Commerce constituted final agency action. Id. at 2773-75.
Because the President could conceivably alter the census figures before reporting them to
Congress, the Court determined that the President, not the Secretary of Commerce, takes the
final action m the reapportionment process. Id. at 2775. In addition, the Court determined
that because Congress did not expressly include the President within the APA's review
provisions, the Court could not consider the President an "agency" under the APA. Id. at
2775-76. Because the President was not an "agency," the submittal of the census figures to
Congress could not be "final agency action" under the APA, and the method of allocating
overseas personnel was therefore unreviewable for abuse of discretion. Id. at 2776. The
Court also addressed a constitutional challenge by the appellees, ultimately holding that the
Census Bureau's allocation method did not "hamper the underlying constitutional goal of
equal representation." Id. at 2778.
154. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at2775.
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Therefore, because the APA did not expressly allow review of presidential
action, the FranklinCourt presumed that Congress did not intend to subject
the President to the APA's review provisions."'
The Ninth Circuit, faced with the Supreme Court's concern about
subjecting the President to the APA, tried to distinguish Franklinby noting
that the issue in Portlandwas whether the President could be an "interested
person" under § 557(d)(1) of the APA, not whether the President is an
"agency" subject to the review provisions of the APA. 155 While the
Ninth Circuit is correct that Franklindid not specifically address whether
the President could be an "interested person" under the APA, the court
should not have rejected the FranklinCourt's implicit message so readily
As in Franklin, Congress did not provide an explicit statement in the APA
that the phrase "interested person" could include the President. In
Franklin, the Supreme Court determined that "[o]ut of respect for the
separation of powers and the unique constitutional position of the President
textual silence is not enough to subject the President to the provisions
of the APA. "57 In Portland,therefore, these same separation of powers
considerations should have provided the same protection, and the Ninth
Circuit should not have found the President to be an "interested person"
under § 557(d)(1) of the APA.
D Analysts of Court'sDeternunationthat Application of the
APA Prohibition on Ex Parte Contacts to the President Will
Not Violate the Doctrine of Separation of Powers
Even if Congress did not intend to exempt the President from the
APA's ban on ex parte contacts, the question remains whether application
of the ban to the President, in the context of the ESA's hybrid procedure,

155. Id., see Nixon v Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 748 n.27 (1982) (requiring explicit
statement by Congress before court will assume Congress created damages action against
President); Harold H. Bruff, JudicialReview and the President'sStatutory Powers, 68 VA. L.
REV 1,18-24 (1982) (discussing applicability of APA to President). Professor Bruff ultimately
concludes that "[n]either the terminology nor the legislative lustory of the APA compels the
conclusion that it governs the President." Id.at 23 (footnotes omitted). However, Professor
Bruff also determines that the requirement of an explicit statement by Congress to subject the
President to a statute would work too great a burden upon Congress. Id. at 31.
156. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1547 (9th
Cir. 1993).
157

Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 2775.
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violates the doctrine of separation of powers. The Ninth Circuit's initial
step of labelling the exemption process as adjudicatory m nature"58 was
the critical move from which the rest of the opinion predictably flowed.
Relying upon Nixon v. Administratorof General Services (Nixon 1),"I the

Ninth Circuit determined that the congressional policy underlying the APA
clearly rendered "de nimmns" any adverse effect on a presidential power

to influence the results of administrative adjudications. 16 However, the
court's characterization of the exemption process as adjudicatory is
suspect. 16 ' Thus, the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the separation of powers
problem under Nixon I may be flawed for failing to take into account the
hybrid procedure Congress designed in the ESA. A proper characterization
of the exemption process leads to the conclusion that Congress's excursion

into the power of the President is substantial, and hence improper.
In Nixon I, President Nixon executed an agreement with the Administrator of General Services, an executive branch official, to store documents

and tape recordings accumulated during the Nixon presidency 162
Worried about the possible destruction of valuable material, Congress
passed the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act,i3

158. Portland,984 F.2d at 1547-48. The court states:
Mhe language of the [ESA] shows that [Congress] intended to create the
Committee as a quasi-judicial adjudicatory body subject to the statutory
restrictions that the APA imposes on such institutions. Congress clearly has the
authority to do so, and thereby to ensure the independence of the agency from
presidential control.
Id.
159. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
160. Portland,984 F.2d at 1546.
161. See supra notes 61-108 and accompanying text (analyzing Ninth Circuit's
characterization of Committee proceedings as adjudicatory).
162. Nixonv Administrator of Gen. Servs. (Ntxon 1), 433 U.S. 425,431 (1977). Under
the agreement to store the Nixon presidential materials, neither Nixon nor the Administrator
of General Services (Administrator) could gain access to the roughly 42 million documents
and 880 tape recordings without the other's consent. Id. at 432. The agreement governed
procedures and time frames for the withdrawal and destruction of the materials, including a
provision that Nixon could order the Administrator to destroy such tapes as Nixon directed
after five years had passed, and a provision that the Administrator would destroy all tapes
upon Nixon's death or within 10 years, whichever occurred first. Id.
163. Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-526, 88

Stat. 1695 (1974).
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which directed the Administrator to take custody of and screen the Nixon
materials, thereby preserving any documents or recordings having historical
value and any materials pertinent to pending criminal proceedings."l
Nixon contested the statute, alleging in part that the legislation violated the
doctrine of separation of powers because the statute infringed upon the
presidential power to control the internal operations of the executive
branch."6 In assessing tis claim, the Supreme Court provided a framework for assessing whether a congressional act improperly interferes with
a presidential duty First, the court must determine whether the congressional act upsets the appropriate balance between the two branches, focusing
on how the act affects the President's authority to accomplish his constitutional functions." Second, if the congressional action impinges upon a
presidential function, the court must determine the extent to which the
policy behind the congressional action justifies the interference." When
analyzing the process of review and consultation contemplated by the ESA's
exemption process, therefore, a court should first determine whether
subjecting the President to the ban on ex parte contacts would impermissibly infringe upon any of the President's constitutional duties. If so, the
next question becomes whether the policy belund the prohibition on ex parte
contacts justifies the congressional infringement.
1 Extent to Wich the Ban on Ex Parte Contacts Prevents the
Presidentfrom Carryingout ConstitutionalDuties
Article II of the Constitution vests the executive power in a President
of the United States and instructs the President to "take Care that the Laws

164. Nixon 1,433 U.S. at 429. The Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation
Act also required the enacting regulations to protect all constitutionally based rights or
privileges. Id.
165. Id. at 440. Nixon argued that Congress did not possess the power to delegate to an
executive branch officer the discretion to release presidentialmaterials or to dictate the terms
that will govern the disclosure of the materials. Id.
166. Id. at 443.
167 Id. In Nixon I, the Court determined that because the Nixon presidential material
was to remain within the control of an executive branch official and because the Presidential
Recordings and Materials Preservation Act requires the Administrator of General Services
to apply any applicable executive privileges, the legislation did not unduly disrupt the
executive branch and was therefore constitutional. Id. at 444-45.
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be faithfully executed."" On the basis of this charge, scholars associate
the President with the constitutional authority to coordinate the magnitude
of statutes that the Constitution charges the President to execute. 69
Accordingly, the President must be able to carry out the national policy
goals he establishes by having the power to coordinate and control the
direction of the various federal regulatory policies.Y By virtue of an

168. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 3.
169. See Bruff, supranote 7, at 462 (noting President has responsibility to "harmonize"
many statutes at once); McGarity, supranote 7, at 448 (noting President's position at center
of executive branch provides him "unique" position for policy coordination). Professor Bruff
believed that the:
argument that the President has some implied statutory or constitutional authority
to harmonize the welter of statutes, or to act interstitially at times, has a
functional basis because legislation necessarily distributes power in a somewhat
fragmentary fashion, and cannot resolve all the future problems of coordinating
policy under separate statutes. The President has a unique vantage point from
which he can focus on a vital issue that falls within the jurisdiction of a variety
of executive and independent agencies, each having power to deal with only part
of the problem.
Bruff, supranote 7, at 462 (footnotes omitted).
170. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting authority of
President to supervise and guide executive policymaking); Environmental Defense Fund v
Thomas, 627 F Supp. 566, 570 (D.D.C. 1986) (same); Bruff, supra note 7, at 468 (noting
President should have authority to control direction of federal regulatory policy); Demuth &
Ginsburg, supranote 7, at 1079-80 (noting how rapid expansion of rulemaking authorities
creates coordination problems); McGarity, supra note 7, at 448 (discussing presidential
authority to coordinate agency disputes); Strauss & Sunstem, supranote 7, at 189 (discussing
President's ability to centralize and coordinate regulatory process). The D.C. Circuit's
discussion m SierraClub is particularly relevant:
The authority of the President to control and supervise executive policymaking is derived from the Constitution; the desirability of such control is
demonstrable from the practical realities of administrative rulemaking.
Regulations such as those involved here demand a careful weighing of cost,
environmental, and energy considerations. They also have broad inplications for
national economic policy. Our form of government simply could not function
effectively or rationally if key executive policymakers are isolated from each
other and from the Chief Executive.
Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 406 (footnotes omitted); see Meyer v Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1297
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (noting President's constitutional duty to oversee regulatory policies
produced by executive branch); Public Citizenv Burke, 843 F.2d 1473, 1477-78 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (noting presidential ability to guide interpretation of statutes by even reluctant
subordinates).
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accountability to a national constituency,"' the President should be able
to use his broad policy perspective to assist regulatory agencies with
policy determinations. 72
When a dispute between two executive agencies that are both trying
to carry out statutory mandates arises,' 73 as in Portland,174 the presi171. See Bruff, supranote 7, at 461 (noting Presidenthas national constituency not shared
by any other oversight mechanism); Strauss & Sunstem, supranote 7, at 190 (arguing that
because President is electorally accountable and has national constituency, he is "uniquely
well-situated" to coordinate regulatory policy to benefit public as whole). Indeed, the
Supreme Court determined the President to be:
representative of the people just as members of the Senate and of the House are,
and it may be, at some times, on some subjects, that the President elected by all
the people is rather more representative of them all than are the members of either
body of the legislature.
Myers v United States, 272 U.S. 52, 123 (1926).
172. See Chevron United States, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (discussing President's authority, due to his direct accountability, to
help agencies make policy choices); McGarity, supra note 7, at 449-50 (discussing role
President's accountability to national electorate plays in regulatory coordination); Pierce,
supra note 7, at 520-21 (arguing policy decisions should be made by most politically
accountable institution); Strauss & Sunstem, supra note 7, at 190 (noting that President's
perspective is particularly crucial when there is national view that regulatory policy should
follow certain course); Verkuil, supra note 7, at 958 (arguing that presidential regulatory
policy coordination may be only way to keep agencies accountable to both President and
public). But see McGarity, supra note 7, at 456-57 (proposing that accountability suffers
when presidential pressure bidden from public record). The Supreme Court states:
Judges
are not part of either political branch of government.
In
contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegatedpolicy-making responsibility
may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent
admmstration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are
not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely
appropriate for this political branch of Government to make such policy
choices.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
173. See Bruff, supranote 7, at 451-56 (noting that overlapping agency jurisdictions can
result from lack of regulatory coordination); Lloyd H. Cutler & David R. Johnson,
Regulation and the PoliticalProcess, 84 YALE L.J. 1395, 1396 (1975) (finding overlapping
agency jurisdictions often lead to inter-agency battles); McGarity, supranote 7, at 447 (noting
need for coordination when two agencies have clash of opposing goals).
174. See SECRETARY'S REPORT, supranote 108, at Intro-4 (noting statutory mandates of
BLM and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service). In Portland,the BLM is under "a legal mandate
to provide timber supplies on a sustainable basis, subject to certain constraints," while the
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dential duty to coordinate the regulatory policy of the executive branch is
especially important. 175 By statutory mandate, the agency action that the
Committee analyzes cannot be local or focused solely upon the interests
of a few individuals. 16 Instead, the proposed agency action inevitably
results in clashes between significant and conflicting executive agency
goals. In Portland, for example, the proposed timber sales caused a
fundamental clash between the ESA's mandate to protect endangered
species and the equally sigmficant and important need to preserve a
regional economy, thereby protecting both jobs and other business
interests. 17'
The President, based on an accountability to a national constituency
and a constitutional mandate to execute the laws faithfully, has the duty
to see that, within the broad parameters of discretion usually accorded the
executive branch in statutory delegations, the executive branch is carrying
out regulatory programs in the public interest. The United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia addressed this duty in Sierra Club
v Costle,' s in which the court examined the impact of ex parte contacts
by the President in the context of informal rulemaking. While the Ninth
Circuit correctly notes that the ESA's exemption process is not an
informal rulemakmg under the APA," 9 the Ninth Circuit fails to realize
that Sierra Club is relevant for examining the extent to which the
President should be able to confer with executive branch officials to
coordinate policy in any proceeding that encompasses rulemaking
characteristics, such as the hybrid procedure in Portland.

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has a statutory mandate to prevent agency action that could
jeopardize listed species or their habitat. Id.
175. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supranote 81, § 7.9 (arguing President should have power to
resolve policy conflicts between agencies). Professors Davis and Pierce state that "[c]ases
that should be styled 'Umted States v. United States,' are both common and unexcusable.
ThePresident should have the power and the responsibility to resolve policy conflicts between
federal agencies." Id.
176. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii) (1988) (requiring Committee to grant
exemptions only to agency actions in public interest and of national or regional significance).
177 See supranote 174 (discussing conflicting agency goals concerning clash between
economic and environmental interests in Portland).
178. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
179. See Portland Audubon Soc'y v Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 154546 (9th Cir. 1993) (determining Sierra Club inapplicable to facts of Portland).
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In SierraClub, the Sierra Club alleged that ex parte contacts occurred
during the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) rulemaking
procedure concerning new emission standards under the Clean Air
Act." s One claim involved a meeting that President Carter held after
the EPA had closed the public comment period of the rulemaking.' 8 '
Other executive branch officials and members of the EPA attended the
closed-door meeting and discussed issues concerning the pending
rules." In analyzing the claim that the intra-executive branch meeting
constituted an improper ex parte contact with the EPA, the D C. Circuit
recognized the President's authority to ensure the consistency of executive
agency regulations with his overall domestic policy 11 While noting that
due process concerns might require the docketing of presidential
communications concerning adjudicatory proceedings," the D C.
Circuit determined that a court should "tread with extraordinary caution"
in mandating disclosure when the President himself is involved directly in
oral communications with executive branch officials. " Indeed, the
court found that unless explicitly forbidden by Congress, such presidential
communications with executive branch officials can take place both during
and after the public comment period." 6 Judge Wald's deference and
conservative approach toward the President's authority under the
Constitution to coordinate the regulatory policy of the executive branch are

180. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 386-89 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

181. Id. at 404.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 405. The D.C. Circuit stated:
The court recognizes the basic need of the President and Ins White House
staff to monitor the consistency of executive agency regulations with
Adnimistration policy. He and Ins White House advisors surely must be
briefed fully and frequently about rules in the making, and their contributions
to policymaking considered.

Id.
184. Id. at 406-07
185. Id. at 407 The D.C. Circuit cited Article 11 of the Constitution and Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519
(1978), for tis determination. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 407 (D.C. Cir.

1981).
186. Id. at 405.
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also applicable to situations such as Portland, where executive branch

officials are engaged m hybrid agency proceedings with significant
regulatory characteristics."
Considering the practical effect in the context of the ESA's exemption
process, the Ninth Circuit's determination that the APA's ban on ex parte
commumcations applies to the President is particularly troublesome. Indeed,
the court's holding would forbid the President or any White House aides

from contacting any Committee member or a member's personal staff on
any matter that a reviewing court ight deem relevant to a pending
In essence, this holding might prohibit the
exemption proceeding.'
President, for the duration of an exemption proceeding,189 from discussing
with Cabinet members the Admimstration's overall policy on the everpresent conflict between economic and environmental concerns. Although
the ex parte ban applies only to commumcations "relevant to the merits" of
an exemption decision,' the Ninth Circuit found a congressional desire
to have courts interpret this phrase broadly '9' This conclusion suggests
187. See supra notes 81-84, 107-08 and accompanying text (discussing regulatory nature of
Committee proceedings).
188. See Portland Audubon Soe'y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1546 (9th
Cir. 1993) (determining APA ban on ex parte contacts is "fully applicable" to President and
White House staff). If the ban applies to the President, APA § 551(14), which defines ex parte
communications, would require the agency to place the substance of any communications
between the President and a Committee member on the public record if the communication is
"relevant to the merits of the proceeding" under § 557(d)(1)(A) of the APA.
189. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(5) (1988) (giving Secretary 140 days to prepare report for
Committee); id. § 1536(h)(1) (requiring Committee to make final determination within 30 days
of receiving Secretary's report). Because the ESA requires the Secretary to hold hearings and
prepare the report "in consultation with Members of the Committee," 1d. § 1536(g)(4),
"interested persons" could not approach Committee members from the time the Secretary makes
the determination that the exemption application meets the threshold requirements of
§ 1536(g)(3) to the time the Committee makes the final determination under § 1536(h)(1).
Indeed, the exemption process could take longer than 170 days because § 1536(h)(5) allows the
exemption applicant and the Secretary to agree to extend the time allowed to prepare the
Secretary's report. Id. § 1536(h)(5). During this time, therefore, the Committee members
would be unapproachable on any matter that could possibly be deemed "relevant to the merits"
under 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1) (1988), unless the agency places the contact on the administrative
record.
190. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1) (1988).
191. See Portland, 984 F.2d at 1546 n.26 (finding Congress meant for courts to construe
phrase "relevant to the merits" broadly) (citing Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org.
(PATCO) v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 685 F.2d 547, 567-68 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
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that a reviewing court could conceivably construe even a general policy
discussion concerning the conflict between economic and environmental
interests as being "relevant to the merits" of an exemption proceeding."
Therefore, the application of the APA's ban on ex parte contacts in the
context of an exemption proceeding could seriously affect the President's
ability to guide his Administration's regulatory policy
Indeed, the
prohibition would deprive the President of the ability to consult with key
advisors for up to six months on matters entrusted to their expertise by
virtue of their Cabinet positions." g At the least, the holding will chill
discussion between the President and a Committee member on issues
approaching the magnitude of the Northern Spotted owl controversy, even
though these Cabinet officials are chiefly responsible for advising the
President and for ultimately implementing the Administration's policy in
these areas. Therefore, under the first prong of the Nixon I framework, the
isolation of the President from Committee members for the duration of an
exemption proceeding constitutes an impermissible infringement upon a
constitutional function of the President."
There is an argument, however, that the application of the APA ban
on ex parte contacts does not truly isolate the President from his chief
advisors because APA § 557(d)(1) would not apply if the agency placed the
contacts on the public record.195 Under this rationale, the President would
not be deprived of the opportunity to consult with key Cabinet officials as
long as the agency places the substance of each communication on the
public record of the agency proceeding. This argument, however, ignores

192. See North Carolina v. EPA, 881 F.2d 1250, 1257 (4th Cir. 1989) (determining
language of § 557(d)(1) entitled to broad reading); Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org.
(PATCO) v Federal Labor Relations Auth., 685 F.2d 547, 563 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (using
legislative history to find that phrase "relevant to the merits" should be construed liberally
to "effectuate the dual purposes of the Government in the Sunshine Act"). But see Louisiana
Ass'n of Indep. Producers & Royalty Owners v FERC, 958 F.2d 1101, 1112 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (noting that APA § 557(d)(1) does not prohibit "general background discussions" of
proceeding).
193. See supranotes 168-92 and accompanying text (discussing President's constitutional
authority to coordinate Administration's regulatory policy and how Ninth Circuit's holding
could intrude upon President's ability to carry out this duty).
194. See Nixon v Administrator of Gen. Servs. (Nixon 1), 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)
(setting out appropriate framework for separation of powers analysis).
195. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(14) (1988) (defining "exparte communication" to include only
oral and written commuications not on public record).
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the Supreme Court's treatment of executive privilege in United States v

Nixon (Nixon 1)."

In Nixon I, the Court recognized a legitimate

governmental interest in the ability to keep conversations between the
President and his chief advisors confidential.'

In Arixon II, the Supreme Court found a presumptive privilege for
presidential commumcations because advisors would otherwise "temper

candor with concern for appearances and for their own interests to the
detriment of the decisionmaking process."" Although this privilege is
196. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
197 United States v Nixon (Nrixon 11), 418 U.S. 683, 705-06 (1974). In Nixon .i,
President Nixon, after a grand jury named him an unmdicted coconspirator, challenged
a district court subpoena directing lm to produce certain documents and tape recordings
regarding conversations with executive branch aides and advisors. Id. at 687-88. The
Court agreed with Nixon that a critical governmental need exists to keep confident
communications between high government officials and their advisors because the advisors
may otherwise "temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interests
to the detriment of the decisionmaking process." Id. at 705. However, the Court refused
to uphold Nixon's assertion of an absolute executive privilege absent a "claim of need to
protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets." Id. at 706. Although
concluding that the President is entitled to a presumption of executive privilege, the Court
also determined that the need to preserve the "essential functions of each branch" could
outweigh the presumption. Id. at 707 In Nilxon 11, the Court found that "fundamental
demands of due process of law in the fair admimstration of criminal justice" outweighed
a generalized invocation of executive privilege by the President. Id. at 713. In addition,
the Court gave the district court the "heavy responsibility" of reviewing the presidential
materials in camera and releasing only those found to be both relevant and admissible.
Id. at 714-15.
198. Id. at 705. The Court found the executive privilege to be "fundamental to the
operation of Government and inextricably rooted in separation of powers under the
Constitution." Id. at 708 (footnote omitted). The importance of the executive privilege
in the Court's eye cannot be challenged because the Court found the privilege "necessary
in the public interest to afford Presidential confidentiality the greatest protection consistent
with the fair administration of justice." Id. at 715; see Nixon v Administrator of Gen.
Servs. (NTIxon 1), 433 U.S. 425, 448-49 (1977) (discussing executive privilege); Sierra
Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting judicial gloss on Constitution
accords President right to invoke executive privilege to "protect consultative privacy").
In lixon I, the Supreme Court stated:
[Tihe privilege is necessary to provide the confidentiality required for the
President's conduct of office. Unless he can give his advisers some assurance
of confidentiality, a President could not expect to receive the full and frank
submissions of fact and opinions upon which effective discharge of his duty
depends.
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not absolute, only the particularly strong countervailing interests of the
criminal justice system, interests that invoked constitutional values,
outweighed the presumption of executive privilege m Nixon H. 199
Equally important, the Supreme Court required the district court to
conduct an in camera inspection of presidential communications and to
release only information relevant to the crimial proceeding.'
In an exemption proceeding, by contrast, there could be no provision
for a limited intrusion, such as the in camera inspection in Nixon 11.
Instead, the Committee would have to place the substance of all relevant
conversations between the President and Committee members on the
public record in order to satisfy § 557(d)(1) of the APA. ° This
docketing of presidential communication would severely diminish the
President's ability to take part m policy discussions with Committee
members. 2
Furthermore, the countervailing constitutional interests
found m Nixon 1I are absent in the context of exemption proceedings.")S
Instead, a reviewing court must weigh any claim of executive privilege in
the context of Portland against the congressional policy behind the

Nixon I, 433 U.S. at 448-49; see Bruff, supra note 155, at 44 (noting judicial review of
presidential action must respect separation of powers limitations on intrusions into
executive branch deliberations); Demuth & Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 1085-86 (noting
deliberative process requires candid discussions of relevant issues); McGarity, supra note
7, at 487 (determaming President must be accorded opportunity to discuss national policy
matters with cabinet members in private).
199. See Nixon 1/, 418 U.S. at 713. The Court found that the Sixth Amendment
guarantees of confrontation and compulsory process for securing favorable witnesses and
the Fifth Amendment protection of due process outweighed the executive privilege in this
case. Id. at 711, see also Bruff, supra note 7, at 484 (noting that NiTxon ff Court may
have decided case other way if competing interests had been less important).
200. Nixon f, 418 U.S. at 714-16.
201. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1) (1988).
202. See Bruff, supra note 155, at 49 (discussing problems with disclosing internal
executive branch policy discussions). Professor Bruff noted that "executive privilege
protects policy debate in the White House from public disclosure; it would sharply curtail
the privilege to require contacts between White House officials and outsiders to be made
public. Indeed, such a rule could increase White House insularity by deterring free
consultatidn." Id.
203. See supra note 199 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional interests
implicated i Nixon I1).

PORTLAND AUDUBON SOCIETY

1079

objectives reflected m the APA's prohibition on ex parte communications.204
2. Policy Behind CongressionalObjectives Reflected in

the APA's Prohibitionof Ex Parte Communications
Section 557(d)(1)'s prohibition of ex parte commuications serves two
distinct purposes. First, the prohibition protects the public's "right to
participate meamngfully m the decisionmakmg process. 2 I Second, the
effective
prohibition helps to ensure the "proper functioning of
judicial review "206 The legislative history behind § 557(d)(1), however,
shows that the prohibition was not meant to "significantly [interfere] with
the ability of the Government to carry out its substantive responsibilities. ,,217 In Portland,the Ninth Circuit found that allowing the Committee to base the final exemption decision on private conversations would
nullify the public's right to attend and participate at Committee meetings
204. See Nixon v Admimstrator of Gen. Servs. (Nixon 1), 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)
(setting outframework for separation ofpowers analysis); see also Bruff, supranote 7, at 484
(determining that balancing approach used by Nixon 11 Court could allow President to
successfully assert executive privilege in rulemaking context).
205. United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519, 540 (D.C.
Cir. 1978); see North Carolina v. EPA, 881 F.2d 1250, 1257 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing United
StatesLinesfor policy behind APA's prohibition on improper exparte contacts); Professional
Air Traffic Controllers Org. (PATCO) v Federal Labor Relations Auth., 685 F.2d 547, 563
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting prohibition on ex parte contacts serves to prevent the appearance
of impropriety and to ensure opposing party can respond to content of private communication); S. REP. No. 343, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1975) (noting ex parte communications
prevent party from rebutting arguments opposing party presented in secret); id. at 37 (noting
purpose of provision is to give "interested persons a chance to reply to anything contained in

the illegal commumcation").
206. United States Lines, 584 F.2d at 542; see North Carolina v EPA, 881 F.2d 1250,
1257 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing United States Lines for policy behind APA's prohibition of
improper ex parte contacts).
207 H. REP. No. 880, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 7 (1976), reprnted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183, 2188-89; see Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Report to the Select Committee
on Ex Parle Communicationsin InformalRulemakingProceedings,30 ADMIN. L. REv 377,
404 (1978) (discussing purposes behind Government in the Sunshine Act). Nathanson
concludes that the Freedom of Information Act and the Government in the Sunshine Act
"represent careful compromises between the right of the public to know what is going on in
their government and the need of government officials for a measure of privacy both in their
internal deliberations and in their communications with various sectors of the public." Id.
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and hearings and to have access to all Committee records. 2 8 Therefore,
the court determined that allowing such conversations would be contrary

to congressional intent. 209
While the ESA does guarantee the public access to all Committee
meetings and records, t0 the ESA does not confer a corresponding right
to participate in Committee hearings.2i Indeed, if the public's ability to
participate m the exemption proceeding beyond the Secretary's hearing

truly concerned Congress, Congress would not have given the Committee
such broad discretion to supplement the evidence gathered at the Secretary's hearing.2 2 Instead, Congress believed that a timely final decision
by the Committee was more important than public participation.213
Consequently, the exemption process does not indicate a congressional
intent to allow parties the opportunity to rebut the substance of ex parte

communications. 1 4 Therefore, only the preference that an agency base

208. Portland Audubon Soc'y v Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1542 (9th
Cir. 1993).
209. Id. at 1543.
210. See supra note 129 (setting out ESA provisions allowing for open meetings and
records).
211. See supranote 130 (noting ESA does not guarantee public's right to participate in
exemption proceedings); S. REP. No. 343, supra note 205, at 1-2 (noting purpose of
Government in the Sunshine Act was not to increase public's right to participate in agency
proceeding).
212. See supra note 126 (detailing broad discretion ESA gives Committee in
supplementing evidence Committee uses to make final decision).
213. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1) (1988) (requiring Committee to make final decision
within 30 days of receiving Secretary's report, without chance of extending time limit) with
id. § 1536(g)(3) (allowing Secretary and exemption applicant to extend 20 day limit for
Secretary to consider application) and id. § 1536(g)(5) (allowing Secretary and exemption
applicant to extend 140 day limit for preparing report for Committee). The 1982 Amendments
to the ESA show that Congress's foremost concern was speeding up the exemption process.
See H.R. REP No. 567, supra note 122, at 14 (discussing reduction of timetable for
exemption decision from 360 to 180 days). Indeed, the Amendments reduced the amount of
time available for the Committee to review the Secretary's report and make the final decision
from 90 to 30 days. Id. at 5. Thus, in situations when the Committee determines that
additional information is necessary, the 30 day limit, which the Committee has no authority
to extend, would prevent the Committee from allowing all interested parties the opportunity
to review the new information and submit responses before the 30 day limit expires.
214. See supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text (discussing policy behind
prohibition of ex parte commumcations).

PORTLAND AUDUBON SOCIETY

1081

final decisions solely upon the record remains to rebut the presumption of
executive privilege in exemption proceedings.2 15
The policy of requiring an agency to base final decisions solely upon
the record has obvious utility from the standpoint of a reviewing court.
A court should review the reasons and information that the agency actually
relied upon when assessing whether the agency's decision was arbitrary
and capricious.216 This policy, however, does not carry the same weight

as the constitutional issues that outweighed the presumption of executive
privilege in Nixon U.2"7 Moreover, as Judge Wald pointed out in Sierra
Club, any agency decision must be factually supported by the administrative record. 218 This requirement serves to police any presidential involvement in an exemption proceeding by preventing the President from

pressuring a Committee decision that the administrative record does not
support.2 19

Although not a perfect cure,tm this limitation is arguably

215. See supranotes 205-07 (discussing policy behind APA's prohibition of ex parte
commnmications).
216. See McGarity, supra note 7, at 460-61 (discussing importance of having agency
rely solely upon record when making final decisions).
217 See supra note 199 (noting constitutional interests involved in Nixon II).
218. See Sierra Club v Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting admimstrative record must support all agency decisions). The D.C. Circuit noted that the:
purposes of full-record review which underlie the need for disclosing ex parte
conversations in some settings do not require that courts know the details of every
White House contact, including a Presidential one, in this informal rulemaking
setting. After all, any rule issued here with or without White House assistance
must have the requisitefactual support in the rulemaking record.
The courts
will monitor all this, but they need not be ommscient to perform their role
effectively.
Id. (emphasis in original).
219. See Demuth& Ginsburg, supranote 7, at 1086 (arguing reviewing courtwill reject
final decisions "not anchored in the record"); Verkuil, supra note 7, at 980 (noting
presidential influence limited by administrative record). Professor Verkuil states that:
So long as the agency and the White House staff are bound by the rulemaking
record in their policy discussions, staff participation in the decision process must
be limited to suggesting outcomes that are supported by that record. Under this
approach, agency and White House staff can be viewed as partners in a process of
collaborative decisionmakmg.
Id.
220. See Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 408 (conceding that presidential pressure could
bring about different result than would have occurred absent presidential involvement).
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enough to allow a presidential claim of executive privilege to prevent the
placing of policy discussions between the President and Committee

members during exemption proceedings on the public record"1
In sum, the Ninth Circuit's holding impinges upon the presidential
authority to coordinate the executive branch.'
In addition, this impingement is not rendered de minimis by an assertion that the President could

still confer with Committee members in their capacities as Cabinet officers
if the substance of any such communication is placed on the record because
The D.C. Circuit noted that:
[It is always possible that undisclosed Presidential prodding may direct an
outcome that is factually based on the record, but different from the outcome that
would have obtained in the absence of Presidential involvement. In such a case,
it would be true that the political process did affect the outcome in a way the
courts could not police. But we do not believe that Congress intended that the
courts convert informal rulemaking into a rarified technical process, unaffected
by political considerations or the presence of Presidential power.
Id. (emphasis in original); see McGarity, supranote 7, at 457 (noting agency can usually
maipulate final decision to fit presidentially pressured outcome). While Professor
McGarity's view cannot be discounted completely, his argument seems to assume that an
agency will usually have the ability and means to manipulate the stated explanation to
reach the presidentially pressured result and still be supported by the adimmstrative
record. If this manpulative ability were so common, however, judicial review would be
almost pointless because a court could never be certain if the agency actually relied upon
the stated analysis.
221. See Verkuil, supra note 7, at 979 (discussing balancing of executive privilege with
needs of judicial review). Professor Verkuil argues that the "need for executive privacy
outweighs the merely statutory interest in seeing the 'whole record' onjudicial review. The
statutory interest is legitimately subordinated to the President's Article II power to execute
the laws." Id., see Glenn T. Carberry, Ex Parte Communications in Off-the Record
Administrative Proceedings:AProposedLimitationon JudicialInnovation, 1980 DUiKE L.J.
65, 92-94 (discussing arbitrary and capricious test); Nathanson, supra note 207, at 394-95
(arguing thatreviewing court willreverse any agency actionthat cannotbe supported without
reference to undisclosed ex parte commuications). Carberry argues that a "court can
review an agency decision under the arbitrary and capricious standard without the disclosure
of all information available to the agency." Carberry, supra, at 93. Carberry notes that
"even if ex parte commuications indicate that an agency decision was motivated by
unarticulated policies or goals, this fact should not invalidate the decision where the
articulated policies are reasonable and reflect legitimate statutory considerations." 1d. at 9394 (footnote omitted). But see Bruff, supranote 7, at 504 (arguing that presidential pressure
to change agency decision that is still supported by record may violate "essential fairness").
222. See supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text (discussing presidential authority
to coordinate Executive Branch).
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Thus,
this assertion ignores the presumption of executive privilege.'
one must analyze this infringement under the second prong of the Nixon I

Court's separation of powers framework.'
The policy behind the ban
on ex parte communications cannot render this impingement de mimmis,
however, for the same reasons the policy could not rebut the presidential
Therefore, this
presumption of executive privilege under Nixon 11.'

congressional intrusion violates the doctrine of separation of powers under
the Nixon I framework.
V Conclusion

With numerous amendments to the ESA pending, 6 Congress should
not ignore the Ninth Circuit's approach to analyzing the exemption
mechanism of the ESA. The hybrid procedures found in the exemption
process create not only characterization problems, 7 but also a separation
Therefore, Congress should amend the ESA to
of powers dilemma.'
define clearly the exemption mechanism as a hybrid process under the

APA. In addition, Congress, keeping in mind the presidential presumption
of executive privilege and other separation of powers concerns, should
expressly clarify the proper scope of the President's authority to intercede
in exemption disputes involving two federal agencies.
Michael A. Bosh

223. See supra notes 196-204 and accompanying text (discussing executive privilege
presumption in context of Portland).
224. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text (setting out Nixon I Court's
framework for separation of powers analysis).
225. See supra notes 205-21 and accompanying text (discussing how policy behind ex
parte contacts prohibition does not outweigh presumption of executive privilege).
226. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (noting proposed amendments to ESA).
227 See supra notes 61-108 and accompanying text (arguing Ninth Circuit improperly
characterized exemption proceedings as reqturing application of § 557(d)(1) of APA).
228. See supra notes 158-225 and accompanying text (discussing separation of powers
problems with Ninth Circuit's holding in Portland).

